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structures of taxation around the world with special attention to Low Income
Countries, (LICs). We use the new ICTD database covering 203 countries with 40
tax items over the period 1980-2010. We discuss some principles of tax design in
a global economy that are relevant for LICs. We also review some critical issues
on corruption and compliance to see how they relate to growth and tax evasion.
We then provide a benchmark framework to assess the overall performance of
the government tax collection. We use the tax effort index that measures the gap
between the potential tax and the actual tax. The novelty of this tax effort index
is twofold. First it takes into account spatial variables to capture the geographic
dependence. Second it breaks down the tax effort analysis tax item by tax item
to capture the possible tax shift. We co...
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1 Introduction
Governments from developing countries have long depended on revenue from
foreign aid but the post-2015 international agenda on financing for development
has focused more attention on the importance of domestic-resource mobilization
(DRM). In particular, the new framework aims to promote reforms that have the
potential to improve government tax revenue in Low Income Countries (LICs).
The focus on LICs is motivated by the huge resource gap required to finance
development needs in these countries. Moreover, improving the tax system is
expected to generate indirect long-term gains. For instance, a well-functioning
tax system is expected to enhance state building and strengthen the state-citizen
relationships (Lieberman, 2002). Whereas increasing tax revenue is expected to
be beneficial for LICs, the way this can be effectively achieved is, however, not
clear. The issue here is how and whether one can increase tax revenue in LICs
and at the same time respect a number of principles of efficient tax design in a
globalized economy?
The recent explosion of globalization has followed a reduction of institutional
barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production.
The effect that this has upon trade between nations is dramatic: world GDP
has increased by a multiple of five since 1960 but the volume of world trade
has increased by a multiple of eleven. It has also become easier and cheaper
to move production facilities and corporate headquarters between countries.
This, in turn, allows taxable profits to be shifted between tax jurisdictions.
The political landscape has also changed with national governments having to
accept constraints upon their ability to unilaterally implement policy. These
constraints can derive from membership of institutions such as the European
Union (EU), from agreement to tax treaties, and from the mobility of the tax
base.
In this paper, we propose a review of critical issues for tax revenue mobiliza-
tion in developing countries. In Section 2, we overview the actual situation of
tax collection in worldwide economies by grouping countries according to World
Bank’s classification of the world’s economies (see appendices). The three groups
are the low, middle and high income countries1. These original illustrations are
based on the new “ICTD Government Revenue Dataset” (ICTD GRD), which
has data on some 40 sub-categories of revenue sources for 203 countries for 30
years (1980-2010) sources.
Section 3 provides a review of principles of tax design in a global economy
that are much relevant for developing countries. This Section draws heavily
on chapter 21 in Hindriks and Myles (MIT Press 2013).We first considers the
characterization of international efficiency and emphasizes that efficiency has
to be defined relative to mobility. One consequence of globalization has been
the increased international mobility of capital. We look at the implications of
mobility for the taxation of capital in general, and the corporation in particu-
lar. Increased internationalization of firms with production in many different
1Developing countries refer jointly to LICs and MICs.
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countries allows a firm to choose where to produce and, to some extent, where
to earn profit. Firms can relocate profit through the transfer prices used to
account for transactions between divisions. We analyze the effect of taxation
on transfer pricing and assess policies used to mitigate the practice. The fo-
cus is then placed more directly on the issue of taxation and location choice.
Some empirical evidence is reviewed. This section then moves onto the design
of indirect taxes in an international setting. The benefits of harmonization are
considered and alternative tax principles are assessed. The section is completed
by a study of tariff policy and the role of trade agreements in liberalizing trade.
Section 4 provides a review of some critical issues on corruption, enforce-
ment and compliance that limit severely the capacity of developing countries to
mobilize tax revenue, and that also limit the scope for growth. This section also
provides some review of the instrument to fight corruption and to improve tax
enforcement.
Section 5 discusses the methodology to evaluate the overall performance of
government tax collection systems. It is essential for developing countries to
estimate the potential tax revenue as a function of some primitives. It is then
useful to assess the gap between the effective revenue and the potential revenue
to provide some indicator on the government tax effort. On the basis of the
existing methodology, we construct an original index of tax effort with a spa-
cial dimension. The novelty of our analysis is twofold. First we introduce a
geographic interaction dimension in the evaluation of tax effort. The tax per-
formance of one country may depend on the tax performance of the neighboring
countries. This is the geographical shift effect. Second, we decompose the tax
effort index tax item by tax item. This is to capture the tax shift effect (for
instance a country may decide to shift from trade taxes to VAT taxes). We will
show that this decomposition approach produces finer and more relevant policy
advices.
2 Stylized Facts on Government Revenue
It is straightforward that government revenues sharply vary according to the
development level2. For instance, in 2000, HIC governments on average could
count on 60 times more revenues per capita than could LIC governments3. How-
ever, this difference in the total revenue collection may hide strong differences
in the structure of revenue collection both at the country level and the develop-
ment level. In this section, we highlight those divergences through a benchmark
analysis of the different revenue components. The first sub-section is dedicated
to the non-tax revenues while the others sub-sections concern the tax revenues.
There are three kinds of non-tax revenue: grants, resource revenue and non-
resource revenue. For tax revenue, we distinguish direct taxes from indirect
taxes. We first describe the composition of each of the revenue sub-categories,
2This has often been shown in the literature from Burgess and Stern (1993) to Fenochietto
and Pessino (2013).
3In purchasing-power parity.
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Figure 1: Total Government Revenue by country groups
define them, and then discuss the features that may explain the divergences
between development levels.
LICs (34 countries) MICs (104 countries) HICs (65 countries)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Grants 0.032 0.037 0.036 0.094 0.003 0.01
Non-Tax Revenues 0.025 0.029 0.077 0.086 0.094 0.113
Direct Taxes 0.040 0.037 0.092 0.060 0.202 0.084
Indirect Taxes 0.072 0.025 0.109 0.052 0.105 0.044
Table 1: Total Government Revenue by country groups
2.1 Non-Tax Revenues
2.1.1 Grants
Although grants are non domestic revenue, this source of revenue may have
an impact on the mobilization of domestic revenue (see section 5). Grants are
generally the primary source of non-tax revenue of LICs. However, it is impor-
tant to note that several MICs benefit more from grants than do LICs. This
difference between LICs and MICs can be explained in part by the governance
problems in the poorest countries (Piccolino et al., 2014), such as corruption,
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governmental illegitimacy and bureaucratic failure4. The important average
aid revenue among the MICs is borne out by a few countries (among them
are Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Palau and The Gambia). Among “DGD partner
countries”, grant revenue is relatively high 5. In 2010, Burundi was the DGD
country most helped with grant revenue, which accounted for around 22% of
its GDP. Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and the Dem. Rep. of the Congo,
completed this “top 5”with grant revenue of around 10% of their GDP in 2010.
2.1.2 Other Non-Tax Revenues
The other non-tax revenue include: revenue from state-owned enterprises, fines
collected as penalties, and revenue from the sale of state assets. Natural-resource
revenue (from taxes or not) is also included among this revenue component
6. The other non-tax revenue increases with the income level of countries.
Of course, the level of development of oil exporters has a strong impact on
this result. The large oil exporters are generally HICs (Bahrain, Equatorial
Guinea, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). In those
countries, government revenue is highly dependent on the export of the natural-
resources. As a consequence, government revenue is particularly volatile (2).
Among the DGD partner countries, hydrocarbon exporters have the highest
non-tax revenue (i.e., Bolivia (gas), Ecuador (oil) and Algeria (oil and gas)). For
Ecuador and Algeria this source of revenue is really important as it represents
around 50% of total government revenue in the period studied (in Ecuador it
reached until 80% of the total revenue in the 2000s).
2.2 Tax Revenues
Among the tax revenues, we distinguish the direct taxes from the indirect taxes
7. The first category comprises taxes on income (personal and corporate), prop-
erty, payroll and workforce and social security contributions while the second
includes taxes on goods and services and trade taxes. Tax revenue relative to
GDP increases with the income level. During the 2000s, HIC governments were
still able to levy twice as much revenue per GDP than were LIC governments.
In HICs, the direct and the indirect taxes are almost equal while developing
countries rely relatively more on indirect taxes. In the following sections, we
study each component of those two tax groups.
4Alesina and Dollar (2000) have pointed out that those signals have not always had the
expected effect on donors behavior, which, in most cases, was driven by political and strategic
considerations.
5The non-DGD LIC’s average is around 5.5% while the DGD country average is around
8.2% of their GDP.
6We use the ICTD nomenclature for the natural resources. As explained by Prichard et al.
(2014), this nomenclature allows one to distinguish the revenue coming from the agents from
the revenue coming from natural resources.
7This nomenclature is proposed in the ICTD Government Revenue Database and is com-
monly accepted in the literature (see, for example, Acosta Ormaechea and Yoo (2012)).
5
0.
20
00
0.
30
00
0.
40
00
0.
50
00
0.
60
00
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
France Saudi Arabia
To
ta
l R
ev
en
ue
 /G
DP
Figure 2: Evolution of Total Government Revenue (study case)
LICs (34 countries) MICs (104 countries) HICs (65 countries)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
PIT 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.019 0.076 0.052
CIT 0.013 0.01 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.014
Property Tax 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.037 0.014 0.010
Payroll and Work Force 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008
SSC 0.004 0.005 0.037 0.037 0.08 0.049
Table 2: Direct Taxes Collected by Country Groups
2.2.1 Direct taxes
Personal income tax (PIT) includes taxes payable by individuals on income,
profits, and capital gains. PIT taxes are commonly progressive and may thus
redistribute income8.Social-security contributions (SSC) are flat taxes and their
main aim is to maintain consumption after retirement and during periods of
unemployment. PIT revenues are much higher in developed countries than in
developing countries. Besides, we observe a clear declining trend of PIT revenue
in the developed countries. This declining trend is occurring in a few HICs (such
as Sweden, The Netherlands and New Zealand), which were characterized by
high PIT revenues in the 1980s and have seen those revenues sharply decreasing
over time. The case of New Zealand is without doubt the most striking. New
Zealand has lost more or less 2/5 of its revenue from PIT over the last 30 years
because of a major program of tax reform in the 1980s. The top marginal rate of
8It is possible to measure the tax progressivity by means of the “personal income flatness”
ratio, i.e., the ratio of the economy-wide average income-tax rate to the top marginal income-
tax rate (Becker and Mulligan, 1998).
6
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
D
ire
ct
 T
ax
es
 /G
DP
LICs MICs HICs
1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s
PIT Social Contributions
CIT Tax on Property
Taxes on Payroll and Workforce
Figure 3: Direct Taxes Collected by Country Groups
PIT was halved in December 1987 from 66% to 33%9. Sweden has over the last
decade organized a major tax shift from PIT to VAT. Among the MICs, PIT
revenues are, on average, increasing. Countries that reflect this trend include
Cabo Verde, Hungary, South Africa, Saint Lucia and Zambia. The case of Hun-
gary is one of the most striking as its PIT revenues jumped from around 0.5%
to around 6% of the GDP between 1988 and 199010. This is contemporaneous
with the introduction of a flat income tax with the Hungarian tax reform of
1988 (Hogye, 2010). Saint Lucia, Cape Verde and the Marshall Islands enjoy
really large PIT revenues. These three countries share a common feature as they
are described as “tax havens” by the IMF11. The PIT revenues of the LICs do
not follow a common trend. Among the countries that have contemplated high
fluctuations of their PIT revenues over the last 30 years, we find Zimbabwe for
which PIT revenue almost totally disappeared during the socio-economic crisis
of 200712. Finally, PIT revenue is globally increasing among the DGD coun-
tries. This trend is borne out by three countries that have recently known high
rate of growth: Morocco, Mozambique and Peru. Concerning the SSC, they are
very low in developing countries (and in particular in the LICs), although they
have increased in all countries over the three past decades. In the developing
countries, the level of awareness of the importance of SSC is increasing over
9Source online: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand online
http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/taxes/page-7
10Note that other ex-Soviet countries (Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Macedonia) have
introduced a flat tax on income in recent years, but the impact on PIT is not clear for these
countries (Keen et al., 2008).
11Source online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/04/taxhavens-
idUSL0423271120080304
12Just before this crisis, the PIT revenue in Zimbabwe was around 0.13% of the GDP.
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time. Numerous social-security initiatives are flourishing13, but the importance
of the informal sector and international competition do not facilitate the set up
of a social security system.
The taxation of corporate income (CIT) involves the transformation of profit
into tax revenue. The level of CIT collected increase with GDP per capita
level (3). Many developing countries rely heavily on corporate income tax.
Despite the falls in statutory and effective tax rates, CIT revenues increased
during the 2000s in developing countries, both as a proportion of GDP and as
a proportion of tax revenue (Abramovsky et al., 2014). In 2010, CIT revenues
represented about 20% of revenues in low-income countries compared with 15
percent in high-income countries. Thus corporate taxation is an issue that is
particularly relevant for the mobilization of tax revenue in developing countries.
Also important is the fact that the CIT is highly concentrated among a few large
firms. According to Keen (2012) the largest 1 per cent of companies account for
around 75 per cent of all tax payments in many developing countries. This tax
concentration is also high in advanced countries. According to Devereux et al.
(2014), in the UK the top 1 per cent of firms pay 81 per cent of UK corporate
tax.
Among the HICs, Australia, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea and Norway have
achieved strong growth in their CIT revenue. The constant growth of CIT
revenue in Australia over the last 30 years has compensated for the fall of other
direct-tax revenue and has remained the primary source of revenue (accounting
for around 60% of the total revenue). In Norway, the tax reform of 2006 may
partially explain the contemporaneous increase of CIT revenue. Before 2006, the
personal income tax rate was much higher than the corporate income tax, which
contributed to profit shifting. In 2006, a tax on dividends and capital gains was
introduced, and the top marginal personal income tax rate was reduced. The
CIT revenue has sharply increased among different DGD countries for the 10
past years (i.e., Bolivia, Mali, Peru and South Africa). The increase of CIT
revenues has been accompanied by a contemporaneous sudden GDP growth in
those DGD countries.
Property taxes are divided into four groups: the tax on personal property
(movable), the intangible property tax, the land tax and the tax on improve-
ments to land (immovable). Property taxes are predictable and collected at
the local level. If there is no land registry, the land tax (and taxes on land
improvement) imply an important fixed cost of inventory and estate appraisal.
However, it is also its lack of popularity that explains the disuse of this tax.
Land being fixed there can be no supply response to the introduction of a land-
value tax. The tax will thus immediately have a negative impact on the value of
the land and thus affect directly the present landowners while the benefits will
be spread over the present and future population (The Economist, 2014). Con-
cerning movable property, the risk is that it discourages investment. The GDP
level per capita allow to approximate the property tax collected (see figure 3).
13See for example the step-program from the ILO:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/socsec/step/reslib/spubl.php.
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LICs (34 countries) MICs (104 countries) HICs (65 countries)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
GS Taxes 0.035 0.021 0.069 0.042 0.087 0.046
Trade taxes 0.035 0.02 0.042 0.042 0.017 0.026
Table 3: Indirect Tax Collection by Country Groups
Besides, this source of revenue is marginal in all of the country groups. Among
the HICs, Belgium, France, Canada and Luxembourg have quite considerable
property tax revenue (around 4% of GDP). In the MICs, it appears that South
American countries have higher property tax revenues (especially Argentina
and Bolivia). According to the data available, the best endowed LICs are Mali,
Nepal and Tajikistan (around 1% of GDP).
The payroll and workforce taxes are proportional to the payroll or to the
number of employees but exclude social benefits. Such taxes are far from being
extracted in all countries and generally represent little revenue for the govern-
ments. The share of this tax increases with the GDP per capita. Among the
HICs, Austria and Sweden collect revenues representing around 3.5% of their
GDP through this tax. Among the developing countries, Belarus, Hungary,
Jordan and Benin are the only countries that are able to collect a significant
amount (around 1% of GDP).
2.2.2 Indirect Taxes
Trade taxes are composed of exports and imports tariffs, both collected on bor-
ders. Import tariffs generate much more revenue than export tariffs do (on
average 90% of trade revenues). Historically, developing countries have relied
9
more on trade taxes than have the developed countries, but trade taxes have
sharply decreased in the three country groups over the last 20 years and partic-
ularly in developing countries over the last decade. There have been no export
tariffs in almost all of the developed countries for the 30 past years. Among
the MICs, export tariffs represented a considerable amount of revenue in Costa
Rica, Ghana, Malaysia, Mauritius and Sri Lanka (up to 5% of the GDP), and
Argentina, Côte d’Ivoire and Pakistan still have substantial export tariffs (be-
tween 2% and 3% of the GDP). Among the LICs, we observe a strong decrease of
this source of revenue, which was still important in Burundi, Comoros, Guinea
and Uganda not so very long ago. Import taxes have been reduced considerably
in the developed countries (in particular in Barbados, Cyprus and Malta), but a
few HICs have still large import tariffs (Israel, San Marino and The Bahamas).
Among the MICs, import tariffs are virtually non-existent except in Lesotho
where this revenue is still extremely large (around 40% of GDP in 2008). In
most DGD countries, the import tariffs have decreased over time. Mali has had
a sharp reduction of its import revenue in the 2000s (a reduction of 6% of GDP
between 2000 and 2010). Niger and Zaire were the only two DGD countries
that increased their import tariffs in the 2000s. Data highlight that different
developing countries have abandoned import tariffs and are now relying much
more on taxes on good and services. This is a general trend of shifting from
trade taxes to VAT and sales taxes.
Taxes on goods and servicesare described as flat taxes, i.e., taxes with a
constant marginal rate. They include taxes on sales (i.e., sales taxes and VAT)
and excise taxes. In Figure (4), we observe an increasing trend of the taxes on
goods and services overall for developing countries. In developing countries, this
increase is largely explained by the introduction of a VAT system. According
to Tanzi and Zee (2000), the introduction of VAT over the past few decades
has been the most visible tax reform undertaken by developing countries. Ebrill
(2001) pointed out that VAT (or a VAT-like tax) can be found in 116 countries
around the world in 1998. In Africa, 45 of the 54 countries of the continent rely
on a VAT system, but VAT revenue is still marginal. In Africa, we can distin-
guish two types of VAT systems: the South African VAT system (very similar
to the single-rate New Zealand GST) used among members of the South African
Customs Union and the EU VAT systems (inspired by the Anglo-, Franco- or
Lusophone versions)14. The EU VAT systems have more exemptions and are
thus more complicated.
3 Principles of Tax Design in a Global Economy
3.1 International Efficiency of Factor Allocation
In a closed economy production efficiency is achieved when the ratio of the
marginal products of any two inputs is the same in the production of all goods.
When this condition is attained it will not be possible to reallocate inputs
14Cnossen (2014)
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to increase the output of one good without reducing the output of another.
The Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency theorem demonstrated that this is
achieved when final consumption goods are taxed but intermediate inputs are
not. The key property of a value-added tax (VAT) is that it is designed to
achieve precisely this outcome. With a VAT producers can reclaim the tax paid
on the inputs they use so only the value added at each stage of the production
process is taxed. At the end of the production process the sum of value added
is equal to the final consumption value. This appealing property of VAT is one
of the reasons for the increasing number of countries using the system. The US
remains a notable exception.
In an international setting there are additional considerations that need to
be taken into account in order to describe an efficient allocation. The criteria
that must be satisfied for efficiency have to include the allocation of production
and consumption within and across countries. The important additional point
is that the characterization of efficiency across countries depends on the degree
of mobility of factors and goods. To see this, consider an extreme case in
which factors of production are absolutely immobile. In this case efficiency
has to be defined with the initial factor allocation taken as given even if a
reallocation of factors across countries could achieve an increase in world output.
In contrast, if factors are freely mobile, then their allocation across countries
must be determined as part of the description of an efficient location.
3.1.1 Mobility and efficiency
These points are now developed by considering a world with two countries A
and B, and two inputs, K and L. The inputs are in fixed supply but may
be mobile between the two countries. The total demand equals the total sup-
ply both for capital K = KA + KB and for labour L = LA + LB . The inputs
are used to produce a single output in each country using the production func-
tion F (Ki, Li). The efficient allocation of inputs (both labour and capital)
is found by considering the decision problem of a central social planner. The
constraints on the optimization reflect the mobility of factors. Let FK(Ki, Li)
and FL(Ki, Li) denote respectively the marginal productivity of capital and the
marginal productivity of labour in country i (with i = A,B) .
Assume initially that the inputs and the produced good are perfectly mo-
bile between the countries. This implies it does not matter in which country
production takes place. The efficient outcome is then described by the allo-
cation of capital and labor to the two countries that maximizes the sum of
outputs F (KA, LA) + F (KB , LB) . In this case production efficiency requires
the marginal product of each input to be the same in both countries, that is
FK(K
A, LA) = FK(K
B , LB) and FL(KA, LA) = FL(KB , LB). These are ar-
bitrage conditions that require the identical returns on each input in the two
countries and are a consequence of the mobility of the two factors. These con-
ditions are more restrictive than the efficiency condition for the closed economy
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involving the ratio of marginal products.
FK(K
A, LA)
FL(KA, LA)
=
FK(K
B , LB)
FL(KB , LB)
. (1)
The consequences of different assumptions on mobility can now considered.
If one of the factors was immobile, then the efficiency condition for the other
factor must be defined with respect to the fixed allocation of labour. For ex-
ample, if labor was immobile then the international allocation is fixed (L¯A, L¯B)
and there is only the efficiency condition for capital
FK(K
A, L¯A) = FK(K
A, L¯B). (2)
In this case the ratio condition (1) does not apply because the immobility of
labor prevents the ratio of marginal products from being equalized.
These examples illustrate the general principle that the characterization of
an efficient allocation depends on the mobility of factors of production and
the final product. This observation is important for judging the efficiency, or
otherwise, of tax systems and policies.
3.1.2 Multinational firm and efficiency
In a closed economy the operation of a competitive market ensures that an effi-
cient outcome is achieved. The same claim is valid for an open economy provided
that the market has the same degree of mobility of the factors and product as
the planned outcome. This need not be the case. For example, capital may be
mobile from the perspective of a world social planner but arbitrary regulations
prevent it being mobile in the market setting. The market will then not achieve
efficiency. In the absence of any differences in mobility it can be asserted that
the competitive market will achieve a Pareto efficient equilibrium.
The extent to which efficiency is achieved when there is multinational (or
any form of imperfect competition) needs a more detailed analysis. The mobility
of the factors and the final product restrict the choices of the firm in the same
way that they restricted the choices of the social planner.
Assume first that the product and the factors are both mobile. The total
output of the multinational is divided between the two countries. The multi-
national firm chooses the allocation of inputs to maximize profit subject to the
supply of factors. The assumption of a common rental rate for capital and wage
rate for labor is a consequence of the mobility assumption: if the factors are
mobile then the prices must be the same in the two countries. The optimiza-
tion has following outcome. The multinational firm allocates the inputs it uses
between the two countries using the same criterion as the social planner.
The allocation of inputs by a profit-maximizing multinational firm and the
allocation by a social planner are characterized by the same efficiency conditions.
Therefore, the inputs used by the multinational firm are allocated efficiently be-
tween countries. This does not mean that the multinational firm will achieve an
identical outcome to the social planner because the multinational firm produces
12
less output than is efficient in order to increase price and extract a rent. More
precisely, what the results show is that given the chosen level of output the
multinational firm will efficiently allocate inputs.
3.1.3 Taxation and efficiency
It is now possible to assess the desirability of production efficiency when govern-
ments use commodity taxes to raise revenue. In a closed economy the Diamond-
Mirrlees principle requires that production efficiency should be maintained.
This argument does not extend directly to an open economy. The reason
for this is that each country has a separate government budget constraint. The
effect of these budget constraints is to make it more difficult to find a direction of
movement from a point inside the world production possibility set that benefits
all consumers in all countries simultaneously. Since a potentially beneficial move
may adversely affect the budget constraint of one or more governments, it will
only be actually beneficial if the governments that lose can be compensated by
those that gain. This problem does not arise in the single country case.
The production efficiency argument can only be established if compensatory
transfers between countries are permitted. If there are no such transfers then
production inefficiency may be desirable. It is interesting to observe in this con-
text that the operation of the EU has the features of a transfer scheme between
member states. The EU budget is funded by contributions from members states
and is used to finance payments to member states. The net effect is equivalent
to transfers between member states. There is no claim that the transfers made
by the EU are the ones required to support production efficiency and justify
VAT but it is interesting to observe the existence of a system that could de-
liver the compensation transfers. Regarding developing countries, we shall see
later that deviation from production efficiency can be required to reduce tax
evasion and tax administration costs (see Gordon and Li (2009)). This suggests
a trade off between production efficiency and tax collection efficiency. We shall
call this the efficiency -compliance trade-off. This explain why many developing
countries have adopted simple turnover tax instead of pure profit tax (?). The
argument is that the turnover tax base is harder to evade and that the tax base
is broader so that the tax rate can be lower compared to a profit tax. The low
turnover tax implies in turn only a small distortion to real production.
3.2 Capital and Corporations
The growth of globalization has particularly strong implications for the taxa-
tion of capital. Globalization has increased the mobility of capital which has
increased the potential for tax competition to occur. Mobility has other impli-
cations. It can result in capital being invested in one tax jurisdiction but the
return paid to an owner located in another. It can also result in a return being
earned by the joint operation of capital located in several different jurisdictions.
Such outcomes raise questions about which jurisdiction should have the right to
tax the income flows from the capital to the owners.
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3.2.1 Capital taxes
Capital taxes include taxes on corporate profit, on interest income, on dividends
from the ownership of stock, and on the capital gains from asset ownership. It is
important for capital taxation in a globalized world that income can arise from
an asset located in one country and accrue to an individual located in another
country. For example, a firm that is headquartered in the United Kingdom may
earn profit by producing in China and pay a dividend to a shareholder who is
resident in the United States. This multiplicity of international locations creates
complexity in allocating capital income to tax jurisdictions.
Capital income can be taxed on either a source basis or a residence basis.
When a source-based tax is in operation the income from capital is taxed in the
country in which the income is generated. For example, a resident of the United
States with funds deposited in a German bank account will pay tax in Ger-
many on the interest added to the account. With a residence-based tax income
from capital is taxed in the country of residence of the owner of the capital.
For example, a United Kingdom resident who owns shares in a United States
company will pay tax on the dividends in the United Kingdom. The alternative
systems have different incidence effects. These effects are now demonstrated
by considering a small open economy that takes the world return to capital as
given.
The introduction of a source-based system implies that the return offered
on investment in the country will have to rise by the amount of tax to ensure
that the net-of-tax return is equal to the fixed world return. This can only
happen if the capital stock in the country falls (so that the marginal product of
capital, and hence the return, rise) which means that capital must flow out of the
country. The owners of capital will not be affected by the tax since they always
earn the world return. Instead, the incidence will fall upon the residents of the
small open economy who earn income from non-mobile factors of production.
In contrast, the introduction of a residence-based tax will not affect the re-
turn earned by investors resident outside the country. This implies that the
pre-tax return in the country has to equal the world rate. If it did not there
would be an opportunity for international investors to increase returns by in-
vesting in the country. Consequently, the post-tax return for domestic investors
will be reduced by the level of the tax. The cost of investment for the firms
located in the country is not affected by the tax so investment decisions will
not be affected. This places the incidence of the tax upon the owners of capital
resident in the country.
The different effects of source and residence systems imply that they have
different neutrality properties. A tax is defined as being neutral with respect
to an economic choice when it does not change the relative values of marginal
benefits and marginal costs involved with that choice. The choice involved here
concerns the flows of capital into and out of a country, and how the imposition
of a tax system affects the location of capital across countries. A source-based
tax applies equally to all capital within a country regardless of its country
of origin. Therefore, the source-based tax achieves capital import neutrality
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provided that all countries exempt capital income earned abroad from taxation
(which they will if they all operate a source-based system). Conversely, the
residence-based system treats all capital income the same way regardless of
where the income arises. It therefore achieves capital export neutrality provided
all countries practice the system or the domestic country provides a full tax
credit for foreign taxes.
The system of taxation in operation can also affect the international pattern
of ownership of capital by altering relative return on assets across countries.
In many cases the ownership pattern should not matter for the real choices of
the corporation but it can do in some circumstances, such as when intangible
assets are involved. When ownership patterns are not distorted the tax system
is defined as satisfying capital ownership neutrality. This can be achieved if
countries levy a residence-based capital tax.
The choice of system for capital taxation has become increasingly important
with increased globalization and the enhanced mobility of capital. The owner-
ship of corporations is more internationally diversified than ever before and an
increasing number of firms are multinational. These changes have increased the
number of issues that have to be taken into account in the design of the tax
system. In a globalized world no country is isolated, and tax changes in one
country can cause a reallocation of financial and productive capital that affects
all countries.
3.2.2 Corporate taxation
Globalization has made corporations increasingly mobile across jurisdictions. If
the tax system attempts to tax profit where it is generated then a multinational
firm will have an incentives to change the location of profit to where it is the
most advantageous from a tax perspective. This can be achieved either through
changing the physical location of the firm (or parts of the firm) to earn profit
in a different location or by restructuring financial flows to make it appear that
profit is earned in a different location.
In an international setting the first step in allocating the tax base between
jurisdictions is to determine where profit is generated. If this can be done, the
next step is to decide whether profit should be taxed on the basis of where it
is generated, or on some other basis such as where it accrues to owners. Both
choices are possible when taxes are being designed. Tax design must also take
into account the ability of the headquarters of a firm to move from one country to
another. Production and office facilities can also move. The important feature
of this mobility is that it often involves a discrete choice: the headquarters may
be in the United States or in Germany, the plant in Vietnam or Thailand (but
not a bit in both). Usually in tax analysis it is the effect of the marginal rate of
tax upon marginal decisions that is important. The situation is different when
a discrete choice has to be made. In such a case it is the average rate of tax
that determines the chosen outcome.
These points can be related to the decisions that a company must make.
The choice of where to produce is made by calculating the level of profit net
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of tax liability in each of the alternative locations. The location delivering the
highest profit net of tax will be chosen. It is for this choice that the average
tax rate is relevant. Conditional on the choice of location the company must
then select the level of output. This is a standard marginal decision for which
the marginal tax rate is relevant. The final decision for the firm is to choose
the location of profit. This is not the same as the real decision about where
to produce, but refers to the nominal allocation of profit through accounting
choices. The following discussion of corporate taxation will treat each of these
issues. They will be discussed separately to isolate the key points but it is clear
that they are inter-related. For example, a firm will choose to locate where the
average tax rate is low, and will produce more at the location if the marginal
rate is low. It will also choose to locate profit in that location to take advantage
of the low tax rate.
Consider a corporation that operates divisions in two or more tax juris-
dictions. Four of the alternative tax bases are now introduced and some of the
issues relating to the choice of base are discussed. The four tax base alternatives
are:
• Source-based taxation: corporate income earned in the country where pro-
ductive activity takes place.
• Residence-based taxation (corporate): income accruing to the residence
country of the corporate headquarters.
• Residence-based taxation (personal): income accruing to the residence
country of the corporate headquarters or personal shareholders (residence-
based taxation), or
• Destination-based taxation: the sales (net of costs) in the destination coun-
try where the goods or services are finally consumed.
The first significant point that needs to be made concerning the choice between
these tax bases is that it is difficult to define the source of profit. This can
arise even when a corporation has a simple structure but undoubtedly becomes
more pronounced as corporate structure increases in complexity. A corporation
may have many different functional units, such as management, production,
marketing, finance, sales, and research and development (R and D), and each of
these functions can be divided between different divisions of the firm in different
jurisdictions. The problem confronting source-based taxation of the corporation
is the allocation of profit across these functions and across the divisions. Each
one of the functions is necessary for the operation of the firm so ultimately has
a claim to be a source of profit. Neither the internal accounting of the firm
nor the information observed by tax authorities will generally be adequate to
allocate profit to sources.
One resolution to this difficulty is to define prices at which the products of
one of the divisions are sold to another. If such prices exist then the profit can
be distributed across sources. Some products may be traded within the firm, or
may be sold outside as well as used inside. In these case observable prices will
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exist. For other products there may be no observable price. For example, the
supply of management services may not be priced within the firm. However, the
distinction between these cases may not actually be that significant. What the
tax authorities require are arm’s length prices that represent the price that the
product or service would be sold at between unrelated parties. Since the prices
used within the firm may not represent arm’s length prices (we explore why when
we look at transfer pricing later) the observation of a price within the firm may
not actually be much more helpful than having no price. A more fundamental
problem is the possibility that no price can be defined for the transaction. To
see this point, assume that the discoveries of two distinct R and D divisions are
critical for the production process of the corporation, but neither discovery is
of any value alone. The arm’s length price is zero individually or positive when
the discoveries are combined. However, pricing the combined discoveries does
not assist with the identification of the source of profit.
These comments demonstrate the difficulties, both practical and conceptual,
involved in allocating profit on a source basis. These problems would have to be
faced by any implementation of a source-based tax. In practice, the problems
are dealt with through rules that attempt to approximate what is economically
correct and through occasional litigation.
At first sight, it might seem easier to identify a residence country than to
identify a source country. Closer inspection shows that this is not necessarily the
case. Defining the jurisdiction of residence of the headquarters of a multinational
can be problematic. In practice, it is defined through the concept of the location
of control and management. The ruling on this point in United Kingdom law
summarizes the position as “the question where control and management abide
must be treated as one of fact or ‘actuality” ’. In brief, this means there is no
absolute principle but a judgement on the facts in each case.
Profits are usually taxed when they are repatriated to the parent company.
Taxing on repatriation provides an incentive not to repatriate, which might
mean that excessive investments are undertaken abroad. So, an alternative is
to tax profits when they are accrued. The benefit of a residence based tax is
that all that must be observed is the total profit of the company. It does not
matter where it is earned. If all countries were to operate on the residence
basis then companies would not benefit from shifting profit around using tactics
such as transfer pricing. However there are two problems with this. First,
the holding company of a multinational is mobile, and it may well move to
take advantage of tax benefits. So consider a holding company located in a
country but with all productive activity and sales taking place elsewhere, and
the shareholders resident elsewhere. There is a serious question about the moral
legitimacy of residence-based tax in this case, and possibly also considerable
mobility of the holding company since it has no real connections to location.
Second, a multinational may have many divisions across numerous countries.
This is not a problem in theory but in practice it may be very difficult for the
residence country to monitor the taxable activity across the range of divisions.
Even though it is only the sum of profit that needs to be known this can only
be monitored using information on the individual components going into that
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sum.
An alternative is to tax the shareholders of a firm on a residence basis when
they receive dividend payments. There are two sources of practical problems
with this choice of tax base. The first problem confronting a tax authority is dif-
ficulty in observing the dividend income that arises from foreign shareholdings.
There may be regulations requiring domestic corporations to report payments
to the domestic tax authority but these need not extent internationally. This
is made particularly problematic by the fact that countries have an incentive to
offer lax regulations in order to attract corporate headquarters. Such tax havens
do exist, and can play host to an exceptionally high numbers of firms. The sec-
ond problem is that the country of residence of individuals is not always clear.
People can be internationally mobile with their country of residence ill-defined
and open to dispute.
In summary, both source- and residence-based systems of corporate taxation
have to confront a range of practical and conceptual difficulties. These difficul-
ties prevent the implementation of either system in a manner that conforms
with the theoretical idea. This has led to proposals for the implementation of
systems that approximate the ideal but can be applied in practice. One such
proposal is now considered.
3.2.3 Formula Apportionment
A practical solution to the problems of implementing the source- or residence-
based systems is to employ formula apportionment to allocate the tax base
across jurisdictions. Formula apportionment aggregates the activities of a multi-
national regardless of location and then allocates the tax base across countries
according to a pre-agreed formula. The formula can be chosen to approximate
either system of taxation. The European Commission has proposed the use of
formula apportionment using a common coordinated EU tax base. The appor-
tionment proposed by the EU is based on the proportion of total sales that take
place in each country. If the profit margin was constant and identical across
countries then this would be a source-based system. Otherwise, it will provide
an approximation to a source-based system. The consequences of using this ver-
sion of formula apportionment are now investigated with the main focus placed
on whether it is consistent with production efficiency and the effect it has on
the choices of a corporation.
To explore the implications of this system, consider a monopolist producing
in two countries using two internationally-mobile inputs. The output produced
by the firm can also be transported costlessly between countries. There is a
supra-national government (representing the EU) that implements formula ap-
portionment.
With the proposed form of formula apportionment a proportion q of profit is
taxed in country A and 1−q in country B. where q denotes the fraction of total
sales that take place in country A. Given tax rates tA and tB the multinational
firm maximizes its consolidated profit net of taxes. The important outcome is
that such predetermined formula apportionment based on sales does not affect
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the international efficiency of factor allocation. This is a point in its favor.
It should not be concluded that formula-apportionment is entirely distortion-
free. Formula apportionment provides a motive to move profit to the low-tax
country. This is achieved by directing more output to that country. If the
demand function is the same in both countries then this implies the price must
be lower in the low-tax country. Hence, a system of formula apportionment
operates as a form of implicit tax in the high-tax country.
3.3 Transfer Pricing
A large source of missed revenue for developing countries is related to interna-
tional corporations (mostly in the extractive sector) operating in those countries
and involves mis-pricing goods and sevices that are transferred within the multi-
national corporation among subsidiaries, mainly with the aim of transfering out
profits to low tax jurisdictions. This misprincing practice can also be driven
by non-tax forces such by the fear of expropriation or confiscation of income,
economic and political instability, fiscal uncertainty, financial repression or de-
valuation. There is also the possibility that money earned on legal activities
leaves developing countries via the channel of fake transactions or illegal trans-
actions (e.g. criminal activity) to generate kickbacks into foreign bank account.
Therefore a weak state with endemic corruption is a serious cause of income
shifting out the developing countries It is also worth noting that mispricing can
also take place between unrelated parties. For instance, an exporter located in
a low tax country and an importer in a high tax country could agree to increase
the price of the transcation. This agreement could include a side-payment the
exporter makes to the importer. Such a payment would have to be concealed
from the tax authorities. It follows that it can be difficult to detetect mispricing
simply by comparing transfer prices among related and unrelated parties.
Consider a multinational firm with divisions in two countries. Assume one
of the firm’s divisions produces a good while the other uses it, either as an
input or for final sale. The price at which the good is transferred between the
two divisions of the firm is known as the transfer price. For the division of the
multinational firm that produces the good the transfer price determines revenue.
Conversely, for the division that uses the good the transfer price determines
costs. The transfer prices on the transactions between the divisions of the firm
should guide resource allocation within the firm. From this perspective, the
firm has an incentive to choose transfer prices that mirror the true costs of
production.
The choice of transfer price also has another implication for the firm: it
affects the international allocation of profit between the countries in which the
different units of the firm are located. A high transfer price will raise the profit
of the unit producing the good whereas a low transfer price will raise the profit
of the user. If the countries in which the units of the firm are located have
different corporate tax rates the firm can set the transfer price to ensure the
largest possible profit is made in the low-tax country. This will increase net-
of-tax profit by exploiting the tax differential. It also affects the tax revenues
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of the countries and provides an incentive for countries to reduce corporate tax
rates. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines describe this in the following
way “Transfer prices are significant for both taxpayers and tax administrations
because they determine in large part the income and expenses, and therefore
taxable profits, of associated enterprises in different tax jurisdictions.”
To prevent firms from using transfer pricing to reduce tax liability many
governments have adopted rules on transfer pricing. The central feature of
the rules is the concept of an arm’s length price. This is defined as the price
that would be charged if the intermediate good was sold to an independent
buyer. This is easy to apply if there is a market for the intermediate good and
the transfer price can be compared to the price actually charged. If there is
no market, which will be the case for many specialized intermediate inputs, the
rules specify a process for determining what constitutes the correct arm’s length
prices. The rules typically allow the transfer price to be freely set, but permit
the tax authorities to adjust that price when it falls outside what is judged to
be a reasonable range for the arm’s length price.
There are practical difficulties in operating the arm’s length standard. It
has already been noted that the good in question may not be openly marketed.
It may also be the case that there is no sufficiently similar item on open sale
to permit a price comparison, or that the terms and conditions of sale may
vary among transactions. Transfer pricing rules usually allow the use of several
methods for testing whether the transfer price is appropriate. The common
methods include the use of comparable uncontrolled prices, cost-plus pricing,
resale price or markup, and profitability-based methods.
Since developing countries lack appropriate tax enforcement as well as legal
and administrative resources, they are generally seen to be more vulnerable to
income shifting. There is a number of studies mostly produced by NGOs which
estimate income shifting and revenue loss for developing countries. Those studies
suggest massive revenue losses as we will discuss later.
Firms can use transfer pricing to obtain a favorable tax treatment of profit.
If there is no limitation on the transfer price then the firm will set an extreme
value in order to locate as much profit as possible in the low-tax jurisdiction.
This process undermines the ability of jurisdictions to levy corporate taxes and
encourages tax competition. To prevent this happening transfer price rules are
needed. The rules typically make use of the concept of an arm’s length price.
Placing upper and lower limits are placed on the transfer price can cause a
distortion if firm sees these limits as endogenous.
3.4 Location
Many developing countries are characterized by a lower productivity of capi-
tal. In response they use tax incentives like e.g. tax holidays or free economic
zones which offer low or zero corporate taxes, to attract foreign investment. It
is controversial whether these incentives are efficient from a national or global
welfare point of view, but their revenue losses are substantial. One aspect of
harmful tax incentives is that what one does not want to happen is member
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states trying to attract firms from other member states. Even with the agree-
ment the differences in tax treatment of corporations across member states still
give rise to relocation with the media focusing on the role of taxation in these
moves. This raises the question of the sensitivity of location choice to tax rates.
The previous section considered the location decisions as given. This section
goes one step further and looks at the issue of how taxation affects the choice
of location.
For most economic choices at intensive margins, such as the decision to work
a little bit more or less, it is the marginal tax rate that matters. The location
decision of a firm is instead a choice at the extensive margin: it will either locate
in one country or another. For such discrete choices it is the average tax rate
that is important. This matters from the policy design perspective. It also
matters from an empirical perspective since to analyze location it is necessary
to construct effective average tax rates. This is a point to which we return after
some theory.
3.4.1 Locational choice
Firms are able to extract rents from competing jurisdictions. The extent of the
rent depends on the benefits to the jurisdiction and location-specific benefits
for the firm. Controlling competition between jurisdictions will reduce the rent
extracted.
Consider two countries, A, B, that will derive benefits Y A and Y B respec-
tively if the firm decides to locate within their borders. The firm has a preference
for country A since it earns an additional rent if it locates there. This location-
specific rent could arise because of a skilled workforce in A or local availability
of necessary inputs. For developing countries this is mostly the presence of nat-
ural resources. The location-specific rent for the firm in A is θ > 0. The two
countries compete by choosing the taxes that they will charge the firm.
Denote the tax levied by country i by T i (so it is a subsidy if T i < 0). The
firm obtains pi + θ − TA in country A and pi − TB in country B. The firm will
locate in country A provided that
TA ≤ θ + TB . (3)
The maximum subsidy in B must leave the country with a non-negative payoff
so
Y B + TB ≥ 0. (4)
Given that country A wishes to minimize its subsidy (or maximize its tax) it
will choose the level of tax TA = θ − Y B . The tax can be positive or negative
depending on the values of θ and Y B .
With this value of TA country A receives
Y A + θ − Y B , (5)
and the firm receives the payoff
θ − TA = Y B . (6)
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If TA > 0 then the location-specific rent is shared between the firm and country
A (with θ > Y B). If TA < 0 the firm extracts a payoff in excess of the location-
specific rent (with θ < Y B).
This analysis illustrates how mobile firms are able to extract rents when
countries compete to host them. The countries will compete to provide tax
concessions, and the firm will choose the location that provides the highest
payoff taking these concessions into account. The other message of the analysis
is that when location is a discrete choice (either A or B) then it is the total
tax payment or, equally, the average tax rate that matters for choice. This is
in contrast to the usual focus upon the marginal tax rate. This observation is
important for empirical analysis of location choice since the average tax rate is
often very difficult to determine – it is often the consequence of a complex set of
taxes and allowances – so has to be constructed. This is discussed further shortly.
As said earlier, developing countries rely heavily on a myriad of tax incentives
(tax holidays, tax exemptions, tax exceptions) that are difficult to control and
that eventually result in low effective tax rates. However evidence shows that
such tax incentives are not the key drivers of foreign investment (OECD June
2013). Investors are more likely to be driven into country by a stable economic
and political environment, good infrastructure and availability of basic services.
IMF (2012) show that in Sub-Saharan Africa "taxation is not a significant driver
for the location of foreign firms, while other investment climate factors, such as
infrastructure, human capital and institutions are". Therefore by providing tax
incentives, governments in low-income countries forego substantial revenue that
instead could be used to foster the elements that really drive foreign investment
(education, infrastructure and electricity). Reducing tax incentives is usually
seen as a low-hanging fruit in tax revenue mobilization. For instance, Mauritius
removed most of the tax incentives for investments and the years following the
tax reform both FDI and corporate income tax revenue have grown rapidly
(OECD 2013). The issue is how to motivate them to do it. Hindriks et al.
(2014) suggest that one interesting option is the use of public investment as
a commitment device for developing countries to stop offering tax incentives.
The idea is that eliminating tax incentives can be optimal (i.e. sustainable)
only once government in developing countries have first chosen to foster public
investment in items such as infrastructure, human capital and institutions, that
really matter to attract capital and foreign firms. The message in Hindriks
et al. (2014) is twofold. First, in an open economy with international market
for capital, public investment (in infrastructure, education, R&D), unlike public
consumption (such as public wages and transfers), can have important influence
on the nature of competition. As a result, governments should look forward
and anticipate the consequence of their commitment on public investment for
competition. Second, public investment is not a reversible decision such as tax
choices, it has long lasting effect and it displays strong commitment benefits. For
that reason it is recommended to delegate the investment decision to a separate
governmental agency and not to mix it with the fiscal authority. Furthermore
when receiving a large amount of foreign aid, the government may consider to
invest that transfer into public investment (rather than public consumption) so
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as to boost its future capacity to tax capital and profit. Thus public investment
is a powerful instrument of tax revenue mobilization in developing countries.
3.4.2 Agglomeration rents
In addition to taxation, location choices are also determined by other agglom-
eration and dispersion forces. The New Economic Geography, developed in the
early nineties by Krugman and others, states that even when high corporate
tax rates deter firms from locating in a country there can still be agglomeration
rents that attract them.
The agglomeration force is the access to the market for inputs and outputs.
The closer one is to the center of activity, then (a) the better the access to the
market to sell output; and (b) the better the access to inputs and intermedi-
ate goods. Because of these factors firms want to locate close to their workers
and workers want to locate close to firms. These agglomeration forces can re-
sult in external economies of scale: as more firms locate in a given region and
aggregate industry output rises the average cost of production falls. External
economies can be due to knowledge spillovers and access to intermediate goods
and trained workers. This increases the incentive for further firms to locate in
the same region. The location of computer chip manufacturers in Silicon Valley
in California is an example of such agglomeration. There is no reason why the
first chip manufacturer located there other than an accident of history, but once
the process began it gathered its own momentum.
The attraction force of agglomeration is offset by the dispersion force that
arises from the competition effect. The closer a firm is to center of activity, the
tougher is the competition from other firms located in the same area. The prox-
imity of location will result in products being close substitutes which enhances
competition.
How the two forces are balanced depends on the level of transportation costs
(or, equivalently, of trading costs). A key result of New Economic Geography
is that increasing returns to scale (at the firm level) and imperfect competition
combined with transportation costs may result in agglomeration. From this
perspective corporate taxes deter firms from a location but agglomeration rents
attract firms. So it is possible to tax the agglomeration rent to some extent
without driving firms away. Tax differences across locations are explained by a
countervailing gap in agglomeration rents. For both low and high transportation
costs, the agglomeration rents are low. For intermediate transportation costs,
the agglomeration rents are higher which implies that taxes can be set at a
higher level in the center compared to the periphery of the economic activity. In
this approach transportation is a proxy for trade costs and so the agglomeration
rents is a bell-shaped function of the trade costs.
3.4.3 Evidence on profit-shifting
The discussion of the international tax treatment of capital assumed that firms
will relocate profit or capital to take advantage of international tax differentials.
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The practical significance of the effects we have identified depends on the extent
to which firms do respond to taxation. There is a large literature that has
analyzed the data to measure this responsiveness.
The movement of profit between locations is much easier than the physical
movement of firms. It is therefore not surprising that there is ample evidence
that international profit-shifting does indeed take place. This is despite the ef-
forts of governments to contain it via transfer-pricing regulations. Evidence of
profit-shifting has been found between the U.S. and various other countries and,
more generally, within the OECD area. The typical evidence is that reported
income within a country falls in response to a unilateral tax increase by that
country. Most empirical studies on tax induced profit shifting are on OECD
countries and use reliable data and rigorous econometric technique.Huizinga
and Laeven (2008) analyze a sample of European multinational firms and find
that the corporate tax base in Germany (highest tax jurisdiction in Europe) has
decreased by 14% due to tax incentives to shift income to lower tax jurisdictions.
In the US, de Boyrie et al. (2007) identify overpriced and under-priced import
and export transactions via the price filter matrix of the US trade statistics.
The result is that US imports are under-priced by about 12.5% of total imports
whereas the value of US exports is overpriced by 5.5 % of total exports. As for
developing countries, most empirical studies so far were done by NGOs. Chris-
tian Aid (2009) use the trade mispricing approach to argue that profit shifting
out of developing countries in the period 2005-2007 was giving rise to a yearly
tax revenue loss of US $ 121.8 billion per year. Obviously this approach may
exaggerate the extent of profit shifting via trade mispricing. First because price
differences within the same commodity code classification may reflect quality
differences. Developing countries are morel likely to export low-price product
and to import high-price products. Second, this approach only reports income
shifting in one direction and disregards income shifting in the other direction. A
more realistic estimate would have to take into account income shifting in both
directions. For instance the overpriced exports and the underpriced imports of
developing countries are ignored eventhough both would shift in income into
the developing countries. Oxfam (2000) estimates that developing countries as
a whole may be losing annual tax revenues of about US$ 50 billion as a re-
sult of profit shifting, tax incentives and the use of tax havens. To obtain this
estimates, Oxfam uses the total stock of FDI in developing countries with an
average estimates of the return on FDI in developing counties of about 20%.
The authors then calculate the corporate income tax revenue using the nominal
average tax rate of 35%. Comparing this potential tax revenue with the actual
tax revenue, they obtain the revenue loss of US$ 50 billion. They argue that "tax
competition and the implied threat of relocation, has forced developing coun-
tries to progressively lower corporate tax rates on foreign investors. Ten year
ago these rates were typically around 35% broadly equivalent to most OECD
countries. Today few developing countries apply corporate tax rates above 20
per cent. (...)If developing countries were applying OECD corporate tax rates
their revenue would be at least US$ 50 billion higher".
The second issue is the response of the international location of real invest-
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ment to differences in tax rates. This is a more difficult question to address. The
chosen location is observed but the rejected alternatives are not, so the factors
that entered the decision process of the firm cannot be observed directly. The
choice of location depends on the average tax rate that a firm faces (controlling
for agglomeration rents). This tax rate cannot simply be read from legislation
for several reasons. First, the tax system may involve several marginal rates
of tax that depend on the profit level. Second, there may be reductions in the
marginal rate in special circumstances such as location in an enterprise zone or
as a start-up incentive. Third, there can be allowances for R&D expenditures
and special depreciation provisions. These factors make the average rate of tax
potentially specific to the circumstances of each firm and have required that it
is computed as part of an empirical analysis.
3.4.4 Evidence on effective corporate income tax rates
The analysis in section 3.4.1 considered a firm making a single-period location
decision. In practice, a firm must assess how the choice of location affects its
value as determined by the future flows of dividends to the owners. This flow of
dividends is determined by both the investment policy and the financial policy
of the firm over the future lifetime of the firm. The analysis of the lifetime
decision problem is complex, but for the purpose of analyzing how taxation
affects location choice it can be considerably simplified. The method for doing
this is to use a perturbation argument: investment is increased by one unit at
time t and reduced by 1−δ units at time t+1, where δ is the depreciation rate of
capital. This perturbation leaves the capital stock unchanged from period t+ 1
onwards so the flow of profit is only changed (or perturbed) in periods t (where
extra investment is financed) and t + 1 (where extra output is produced and
investment reduced). The total effect of this perturbation can be summarized
by calculating the net present value (NPV ) of the additional costs and revenues.
For each potential location a NPV can be defined before tax (NPV B) and
after tax (NPV A). The choice of location is determined by the comparison
of the after-tax NPV s. This comparison can be related to taxation by using
the NPV A and NPV B to define an effective average tax rate (EATR). The
standard way to do this is to determine the net present value of the increase in
revenues from the perturbation, NPV R. The perturbation increases investment
by one unit at t so raises capital by one unit at t+ 1. Assume the extra unit of
capital produces additional output that earns revenue p at time t+1. The value
of this additional revenue at t is NPV R = p1+r where r is the interest rate. The
EATR is then defined by
EATR =
NPV B −NPV A
NPV R
. (7)
The reason for measuring the EATR relative to NPV R is that this will almost
certainly be positive (because it is an increase in revenue without subtracting
costs) whereas either of NPV B or NPV A could be zero (or negative) because
they include the additional cost of investment. Broadly speaking the EATR
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can be interpreted as the ratio between the present discounted value of taxes to
the present discounted value of profits.
Computing the EATR for each location provides a comparison of the level of
taxes. Computing the EATR over time for a given country gives the evolution
of effective average tax rate in that country. The general trends for the CIT
in OECD countries was a decline of the effective average tax rates that was
less than the decline of the statutory tax rates. The interpretation is that those
countries were cutting nominal rates to limit the profit shifting out of the country
and to attract mobile foreign direct investment, while broadening the tax base
to limit the impact on tax revenue (Loretz, 2008). A similar general trends was
observed for developing countries. According to (Abramovsky et al., 2014), the
average statutory CIT has decreased from 31 per cent in 1996 to 26 per cent
in 2010. Moreover the fall in statutory rates was greater in smaller countries.
Despite the fall in statutory and effective tax rates, the CIT revenues increased
over that period in developing countries as well as in OECD countries, both as
proportion of GDP and as a proportion of tax revenue.
One line of research has considered the effects of United States tax policy. It
has been shown that companies that can claim tax credits against their home-
country tax bill for state income taxes paid in the United States are less likely
to avoid high-tax states. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction. In
addition, the evidence demonstrates that United States firms shifted away from
international joint ventures in response to the higher tax costs created by certain
provisions of the United States Tax Reform Act of 1986.
A alternative line of research estimated the sensitivity of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) to changes in tax regimes. Many studies have been undertaken
which suggest an elasticity somewhere in the range −0.6 and −1.5, with a value
that varies across countries. Some studies have reported even higher figures.
The theoretical analysis shows how the mobility of firms can enable rent
extraction. The empirical studies provide evidence that taxation does have a
significant effect on the location of profit and of activity. The design of the
international tax structure is therefore important. This is why there is so much
concern about competition for the location of firms that will distort location
choice.
3.5 Harmonization of Taxes
When applied to international tax policy the process of harmonization implies
a reduction in the dispersion of tax rates, though not necessarily achieving, a
common value for tax rates. Complete harmonization would replace a range of
different tax rates across countries with a single tax rate. This could be, for
example, the average of the initial tax rates. A partial harmonization would
move the individual tax rates a little closer to a common target.
It is not immediately obvious that harmonization can raise economic welfare.
Applying the Ramsey inverse elasticity analysis of commodity taxation provides
a reason to believe that harmonization may well reduce welfare. Recall that the
inverse elasticity rule demonstrates that tax rates should be differentiated across
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goods to reflect the demand conditions for each. Extending this argument to
countries suggests that VAT rates should be based on local demand elasticities.
If these elasticities vary across countries then implementing a process of har-
monization will move the system away from the efficient outcome. There are
two reasons why this anti-harmonization argument may not apply. First, the
existing tax rates need not be efficient. Second, there may be inefficiencies that
are not resolved (or may even be enhanced) by the imposition of differentiated
taxes. These arguments are now briefly explored.
It is always possible that the existing set of tax rates have been selected
for reasons other than efficiency. They may have been the outcome of lobbying
or of historical precedent. Whatever the case, if the tax rates are not efficient
then harmonization may be able to raise welfare. Harmonization can even be
improving if the tax rates have been chosen efficiently. This is because there is
a distinction between what is efficient for each country and what is efficient for
a set of countries. If each country chooses its tax rates to maximize national
welfare then it will not take into account spillover effects on other countries. It
is then possible that harmonization can move the tax rates closer to those that
maximize aggregate welfare. We explore this argument in more detail below.
One form of inefficiency that has been the basis of a practical argument in
favor of harmonization of VAT is cross-border shopping. Cross-border shopping
is inefficient because it involves individual consumers being driven by tax dif-
ferentials to personally transport commodities. The transport of commodities
across borders by firms can exploit economies of scale; cross-border shopping
by individuals does not. In addition, individual transportation increases con-
gestion and environmental damage. These costs are avoided if VAT rates are
harmonized because it removes the incentive to engage in cross-border shop-
ping. More generally, harmonization lessens the distortion of trade patterns
which may enhance the efficiency of trade.
These competing perspectives show that the question of whether harmo-
nization can be beneficial is a significant one that does not have an immediately
obvious answer. Insight into the question can be obtained by considering two
countries that impose different rates of VAT. This permits a harmonization of
the rates to be imposed and the welfare consequences determined. The question
is whether such a harmonization can raise the welfare levels of both countries.
A case for harmonization can be constructed when countries choose tax rates
independently and ignore the effects upon other countries. The source of the
inefficiency comes from the dependence of the equilibrium price on the tax rates
which means that domestic tax policy in one country affects the terms of trade
for the other country. This is a form of externality between the countries. If
the tax rates are chosen independently then this externality will not be inter-
nalized and the resulting trade equilibrium will be inefficient. Notice that this
is a consequence of assuming that the countries are “large” in the sense that
their actions have a significant effect on the world price. In contrast, if the
countries were assumed “small” then the terms of trade would be perceived as
fixed and the externality would not exist. In the presence of such externalities,
tax harmonization can be desirable for both countries.
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There are caveats to this argument. If one – or both – of the countries prefer
independent taxation to the harmonized tax rates then harmonization will not
raise welfare. Note that unlike the joint taxation solution, harmonization can
make both countries worse off . We have also said little about the role of tax
revenue. If tax revenue is used in a beneficial manner (for example, to provide a
public good) then it will matter how the partial harmonization affects revenue.
If it leaves revenue unchanged the argument holds as given. If it changes revenue
then the argument will need to be extended to take this into account.
The argument for (partial) harmonization is enhanced if there are other
inefficiencies – such as cross-border shopping – that are reduced by partial har-
monization. It is also enhanced if there are other externalities between the
countries generated by the taxes. One example could be the locational de-
cisions of firms as described before. Despite the potential benefits of partial
harmonization it is important to stress that it is very much a second-best policy
if the jointly determined taxes are not uniform. In almost all cases there will be
some method of combatting the externality that allows the countries to retain
the right to set different tax rates.
3.6 Destination vs Origin Principles
The completion of the EU single market has raised some unanswered questions
about how to operate the VAT system. Prior to 1993 the operation of the VAT
system involved commodities being taken out of tax in the exporting country
and brought into tax in the importing country. This was achieved by the zero-
rating of exports, combined with subjecting all imports to VAT. In 1993 border
controls within the EU were abolished to facilitate free trade and a level playing
field between firms operating within and across member states in the EU. This
undermined the operation of the VAT system and has lead to a search for a
system that is consistent with the principles of the single market. The EU
committed to introducing a “definitive” system by 1997 but this is still not in
place.
When a commodity crosses a border between the place of production and the
place of consumption the question of which country should levy tax is raised.
Should it be the country where the good is produced or the country where it is
consumed? VAT is fundamentally a system of consumption taxation. By design
the (formal) incidence of VAT falls upon the final consumer. At each stage in
the production process the VAT paid on inputs can be reclaimed, so that VAT
is only paid on the value added. Only the final consumer is unable to reclaim
VAT.
There are two distinct principles of taxation that correspond to the choice
between levying taxes on consumption or production. Under the destination
principle goods are taxed in the country of final consumption. Under the origin
principle goods are taxed in the country of production. An important practical
distinction between them is that the destination principle requires borders to
monitor movement of goods whereas the origin principle does not. The EU
system with zero-rating of exports reflects an application of the destination
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Good 1 Good 2 Wage
Country A wA [1 + tA] wB [1 + tA] wA
Country B wA [1 + tB ] wB [1 + tB ] wB
Table 4: Prices and wages in destination regime
Good 1 Good 2 Wage
Country A vA [1 + tA] vB [1 + tB ] vA
Country B vA [1 + tA] vB [1 + tB ] vB
Table 5: Prices and wages in origin regime
principle. There have been numerous proposals that the EU should move to the
origin principle to ensure that the tax system is compatible with the absence of
internal borders. These proposals are often based on the observation that the
two systems are equivalent in the sense that a switch from one to the other will
not lead to any reallocation of resources. This equivalence is now demonstrated.
In a closed economy with no exports or imports the consequence of the
circular flow of income is that consumption and production must be equal.
Expressed formally, over any given period of time
Value of consumption = Value of production. (8)
The equality between these two flows implies that it does not matter whether
consumption or production is taxed. A tax at a fixed rate levied on final con-
sumption will have exactly the same economic effects as the same tax levied
on production. The interesting question is how this equivalence of a consump-
tion tax and a production tax translates to an open economy engaged in trade.
The key insight is that the same logic still applies but with one extra degree of
complication.
To demonstrate the argument assume there are two countries (A, B) and
two goods (1, 2). Good 1 is produced in A, good 2 is produced in B. The goods
are produced with constant returns to scale using only labor as an input. The
tax rate in country i is ti. The wage rate in i is wi with destination taxation
and vi with origin taxation. The prices with destination taxation are given in
table 4. The prices with origin taxation are given in table 5.
The next step is to adopt the price normalization wB = 1 and vB = 1, and
then express the prices of the two goods relative to the wage rates wA and vA.
The real prices of the two goods are displayed in tables 6 and 7. It is these real
prices that determine resource allocation.
Consider starting with the destination principle in operation. The real prices
shown in table 6 must be the equilibrium prices that clear the markets for the
two goods and labor in each country. Now switch to the origin principle. After
the switch the wage rate in country A must adjust to the new structure of taxes
to ensure that equilibrium is attained. The equivalence argument is completed
by observing that the wage rate with the origin principle and the wage rate with
29
Good 1 Good 2
Country A 1 + tA 1+tAwA
Country B wA [1 + tB ] 1 + tB
Table 6: Prices and wages in destination regime
Good 1 Good 2
Country A 1 + tA 1+tBvA
Country B vA [1 + tA] 1 + tB
Table 7: Prices and wages in origin regime
the destination principle must be related by
vA =
[
1 + tB
1 + tA
]
wA. (9)
This relation must hold because it is the only one that ensures the real
commodity prices are identical in tables 6 and 7: the initial real prices attained
equilibrium so they must remain the same to attain equilibrium after the switch.
This demonstrates that switching from one of these tax principles to the other
does not change the equilibrium. Instead, the wage rate adjusts to compensate
for the change in relative tax rates so as to leave the equilibrium unchanged.
This equivalence was described by the economist Tinbergen in a 1956 report
for the European Steel and Coal Community (the forerunner of the EU). The
result shows that borders can be eliminated inside a single market and a system
of destination taxation replaced by a system of origin taxation. Real resource
allocation will not change as a consequence of the change in tax system. The
conditions under which the equivalence results holds are much more general
than those in the example. All that is required for it to hold is that taxation
within each country is uniform (so all commodities are taxed at the same rate)
and that the wage rate (or the exchange rate in a monetary model) can adjust.
The insight for policy is that origin taxation provides a viable alternative to
destination taxation. The implementation of some form of origin system (though
probably not the simple form used above) remains a “long-term goal” of the EU.
There is no (publicly known) movement toward that goal at the present time.
It remains a problem that has to be resolved in the construction of a “definitive”
tax system.
The insight for policy is that the origin principle provides a viable alternative
to the destination principle. An origin system would operate successfully in the
single market. This has been recognized since before the founding of the EU.
It would also allow EU member states the freedom to set their own tax rates
without the intensity of tax competition that occurs with destination tax.
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3.7 Tariff Policy
A tariff is a charge levied as a good crosses a border into a country. The
advantage of tariffs over forms of taxation is that they are generally easy to
collect. Recall that taxes are most easily collected when they are levied on
observable activities that are public information. A good crossing a border
is observable, particularly if the good is carried on a ship that must enter a
port. Hence, tariffs can be used to raise revenue even if other parts of the tax
administration are weak. Tariffs also offer protection to home industry relative
to foreign industry since they make the price of imported goods more expensive
relative to home produced goods. This makes tariffs attractive to countries
wishing to encourage development. The drawbacks of using tariffs are that they
are distortionary and may be met with retaliatory tariffs from trade partners.
3.7.1 Welfare cost of tariffs
The imposition of a tariff on a good raises the price faced by domestic consumers,
increases the price received by domestic producers, and raises some revenue
for the government. Since a tariff is a form of distortion it must be the case
that it creates a deadweight loss. The allocation of this deadweight loss is
more interesting, and it may even be the case that a country can gain by the
introduction of a tariff.
The effects of a tariff depend upon whether the country is large or small .
The meaning of large is that the policy actions of the country have an effect
upon the price of traded goods on world markets. Conversely, small means that
the country does not affect world prices. Therefore we can reasonably assume
that small country refers to developing country and large country to advanced
country.
We begin by analyzing the effect of a tariff levied by a small (developing)
country. Assume that there are two goods. The country imports one of these
goods and exports the other. The country is small so imports are arrived at
the fixed world price pM and exports can be sold at fixed world price pX . The
imposition of a tariff τ implies that the domestic price of the imported good is
qM = pM +τ. This is the price that is paid by domestic consumers and the price
that is earned by domestic firms on domestic sales (domestic firms do not pay
the tariff).
The effect of the tariff is as follows. The imposition of the tariffs increases
domestic supply from s0 to s1, but reduces domestic consumption from d0 to
d1. Imports fall from d0− s0 to d1− s1. The producer surplus of domestic firms
is increased by the amount a and the revenue accruing to the government from
the tariff is b = (d1−s1)τ . The fall in consumer surplus is a+ b due to the price
increase , plus c due to the reduction of demand from d0 to d1. Hence, the tariff
causes a deadweight loss equal to the area c representing the surplus loss for
those consumers who can no longer afford to buy at the higher price. This is the
standard result that the imposition of a tariff by a small (developing) country
will reduce welfare.
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There is a caveat to this result that should be noted. It was assumed implic-
itly that the two forms of surplus and government revenue are valued equally.
The introductory discussion noted how tariffs are a practical form of policy to
implement in a country with limited tax administration capability. In such a
case it is likely that a social valuation would weight government revenue more
highly than consumer surplus. An example would be a country which needed
the tariff revenue to finance the provision of an essential public good (public
infrastructure, basic education, basic health care). We will see in the growth
section that minimal tax can be essential to secure a positive growth rate. This
opens the possibility that the tariff could increase the welfare measure when the
use of revenue is added to the analysis.
The welfare effect of a tariff in a large (advanced) country is potentially
very different due to the effect of the policy upon world prices. When a large
country introduces a tariff on an imported good this will encourage domestic
firms to increase output. This raises world output and reduces the world price
of the imported good. In addition, since domestic firms produce more of the
imported good they must produce less of the exported good. The world price
of the export increases as a consequence. The changes in world prices can be
beneficial to the domestic country.
This discussion can be summarized using the concept of the terms of trade.
The terms of trade measure the price of the exported good relative to the price
of the imported good, pXpM . An improvement in the terms of trade (meaning an
increase in pX relative to pM ) is advantageous for the domestic country since it
allows more units of the import for each unit of export. The effect of the tariff is
to improve the terms of trade and this can permit the domestic economy to gain
from the imposition of a tariff. This does not have to hold in all circumstances
since it depends on the size of the tariff and the extent to which the world price
falls. However, there is one result that can be established: a large (advanced)
country will always gain by introducing a small tariff. That is, starting from a
position with no tariff the country can increase welfare if it implements a tariff
that is just above zero. This is because the terms of trade effect dominates the
loss of consumer surplus for a small tariff. It follows from this that there must
be an optimal tariff, τ∗ > 0, which maximizes the welfare of the large country.
This tariff is optimal conditional on other countries not changing their policies
in response.
A tariff is always a distortion in the pricing system which must cause a
deadweight loss. So, if a large country gains from the tariff, where does the
deadweight loss arise? The answer is that the trading partners of the large
country must lose. They suffer a deterioration in the terms of trade since the
price of the good they import rises relative to the price of their export. This
causes a welfare loss. Hence, the introduction of a tariff is always damaging for
trading partners. Since the tariff must cause a reduction in world welfare, the
trading partners always lose more than the large country gains.
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3.8 Trade Agreements
In an attempt to protect the US economy during the depression the Smoot-
Hawley Act of 1930 introduced heavy tariffs on imports. This was met by swift
retaliation from Canada and reversed many years of trade liberalization. At the
conclusion of the World War II pressure mounted for a reduction IN tariffs to
secure the benefits of increased international trade. There have been numerous
trade agreements since 1945 that have secured significant reductions in tariffs
and ushered in the current era of globalization. There seems little doubt that
these trade agreements have benefited developed countries but many would
argue they have been to the disadvantage of developing countries.
A fundamental premise of economics is that voluntary trade is welfare-
enhancing: if two parties choose to enter a trade then both must gain. In
the absence of market failure this argument leads to the conclusion that unreg-
ulated trade will attain a Pareto-efficient distribution of resources. If correct,
this implies that any government intervention to prohibit trade, restrict trade,
or to levy taxes and tariffs creates a distortion and causes a loss of efficiency.
Furthermore, these arguments are as relevant for trade between countries as
they are to trade between individuals and provide the basis for seeking free
trade.
The basic explanation for trade between countries is comparative advantage
which is based on the rate at which one good is given up to get another. It
is distinct from absolute advantage that measures quantity of inputs used to
produce output. Comparative advantage exists even in the absence of absolute
advantage. Trade allows countries to specialize in the goods they produce rel-
atively efficiently. Specializing and trading increases welfare. The benefits of
trade are enhanced when countries differ in endowments so can specialize in
production of the goods which use their abundant factors intensively. Increased
trade also expands market size which permits gains to be obtained from exter-
nal economies of scale. Increased competition from abroad also forces domestic
firms to be efficient. In the longer run the rate of economic growth can be
increased through FDI and the import of innovation. The summary of these
arguments is that free trade is superior to autarky (the position of no trade)
and superior to an intermediate regime of trade restrictions.
It needs to be observed that the benefits of free trade rely on the assumption
that market failure is absent. If there are pre-existing market failures then free
trade may not lead to the benefits described. Involuntary unemployment due
to market failure may be made worse by liberalization if labor market rigidity
hinder redeployment of labor to the production of exports. Markets may be
missing so that intermediate goods are not available for the production of final
goods (but, conversely, free trade may allow the necessary intermediates to be
imported). Countries may not have adequate financial markets to permit risk
to be hedged so that liberalization can increase volatility. Such market failures
undermine the argument for free trade but they do not prove that intervention
is better: the benefits of intervention need to be demonstrated.
These comments provide background to what the trade agreements have
33
been trying to achieve and also help explain the current deadlock in the latest
round. The successive rounds of talks are now described and there achievements
documented.
There have been nine rounds of world trade talks. The first eight rounds
were conducted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The Doha Round are the current talks and began in 2001 but have not yet
reached conclusion. GATT was a draft charter for the International Trade
Organization (but the charter was not ratified by the US Congress) and became a
multilateral treaty in 1948. GATT set principles for the negotiation of reduction
in tariffs, the reduction in other impediments to trade, and the elimination of
discriminatory practices. It also provided a forum for exchange of concessions
and the settlement of trade disputes. The success of GATT in liberalizing world
trade is clear from the substantial increase in world trade since 1948. In this
sense at least, GATT was successful in promoting the liberalization of trade.
GATT was succeeded by the World Trade Organization in 1995 which is now
the body that overseas trade talks and arbitrates over trade disputes.
A strong argument can be made that the world trade system which has
emerged from the successive agreements is tailored to suit developed countries.
The fact that developing countries played little role in the first seven rounds is
significant in this. Furthermore, Article XVIII of the 1947 agreement provided
for “special and differential treatment” for developing countries. In principle,
this was intended to assist developing countries by permitting them greater
freedom in trade policy. The consequence in practice was that it marginalized
those countries in negotiations.
The purpose of GATT was to reduce barriers to trade. This was achieved by
negotiating tariff reductions and by the process of tariffication: changing non-
tariff barriers (such as a quota) into an equivalent tariff that led to the same
level of trade. Two arguments lay behind the process of tariffication. First, it
made the size of the barrier explicit. Second, it was believed to be easier to
negotiate future reduction in tariffs than it was to negotiate reductions in non-
tariff barriers. The downside was that countries could exploit the tariffication
process to set a high initial tariff which gave something that could be traded for
in future concessions.
There is now doubt that the successive rounds of talks have significantly
reduced the level of tariffs on goods traded between developed countries. This
is demonstrated in table 8 which shows that the levels of tariffs are now on
average very low after the successive rounds of trade talks. The average tariff
on goods imported from other high-income countries is 0.8 percent. So, on trade
between high-income countries, there is very little scope for further reductions.
The position on imports from developing countries is worse but not by a great
deal: the average tariff levied by high-income countries on manufactured goods
from developing countries is higher at 3.4 percent. In contrast, developing
countries on average levy higher tariffs and the highest average tariffs are on
trade between developing countries. A different story emerges from table 9
which reports tariffs on trade in agricultural products. The average tariff is
much higher than it is for manufactured products which is a reflection of the
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Importing region
Exporting
region
High-income
countries
Developing
countries
High-income
countries
0.8 10.9
Developing
countries
3.4 12.8
World 1.5 11.5
Table 8: Average tariffs on manufactured products
Importing region
Exporting
region
High-income
countries
Developing
countries
High-income
countries
15.9 21.5
Developing
countries
15.1 18.3
World 15.6 20.1
Table 9: Average tariffs on agricultural products
focus of the early rounds of trade talks. What the two figures have in common
is that it is the developing countries that levy the highest tariffs on average.
Further details of the protection offered to the agricultural sector, and the
food sector more generally, is given in table 10. This shows that there can be
high levels of tariff, significant export subsidies, and production subsidies. Each
one of these is an impediment to free trade. It has been argued that the trade
policies of developed countries impede development. One justification for this
argument is that tariffs on processed food imports are 42 percent in Canada, 65
percent in Japan, and 24 percent in the EU. In contrast, the tariffs on the least
processed food items are 3 percent, 35 percent, and 15 percent respectively.
This tariff structure discourages developing countries from moving into food
processing and limits the value added they derive from agriculture. A second
justification can be found in the level of farm subsidies in developed countries.
In 1986-88 OECD farm subsidies were equal to 51 percent of the value of farm
production. Such subsidies have proved highly persistent: in 2002 they were
still 48 percent of value. Subsidies of this level greatly reduce the ability of
developing countries to compete in world agricultural markets.
The Uruguay Round that began in 1986 was characterized by a significant
increase in the number of countries that participated. This round also extended
the scope of the discussion. It included talks on services, Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property and Trade-Related Investment Measures. The
round was brought to a close in 1993 and was predicted to bring large welfare
improvements for developing countries. Estimates since have suggested that
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Import tariff Export subsidy Production subsidy
Food grains 23 1 6
Feed grains 97 4 11
Oilseeds 4 0 9
Meat and livestock 17 8 2
Dairy 23 27 2
Other agriculture 11 0 0
Other food 1 0 0
Beverages and tobacco 18 0 0
Table 10: Protection to agriculture
developing countries actually suffered a loss as a result of the Uruguay round.
Explanations for the difference between the expected and the actual outcome
were that the agreement to remove barriers to trade in textiles was back-loaded
so did not come into effect until several years after the round was completed. It
has also been suggested that the benefits from tariffication were overestimated
and the implementation of the agreement proved costly. Furthermore, the av-
erage OECD tariff on imports from developing countries remained four times
larger than the average tariff on imports from developed countries.
The latest round of talks began in Doha in 2001. These aimed to set the
mandate of the World Trade Organization (which replaced GATT in 1995) after
the previous meeting in Seattle in 1999 ended in failure. The Doha Declara-
tion outlined a framework for negotiations which focused on the promotion of
economic development and led to it being given the name of “The Development
Round”. In 2003 the WTO convened a meeting in Cancun in Mexico. This ended
without agreement because the developing countries felt that the EU and US
had not given ground on agricultural subsidies. The developing countries also
saw significant costs arising from the implementation of new regimes concerning
competition policy, investment regulations, trade and customs procedures, and
intellectual property rights.
The Doha talks were suspended in July 2008. The EU and India were
blamed by the US for trying to exclude too many agricultural products from
tariff cuts. China and India refused to lower barriers to imports of subsidized
agricultural goods. For several West and Central African countries the US
cotton subsidy is a primary issue. In negotiations the US refused to reduce
the subsidy but offered more aid instead. This proved unacceptable. However,
there are two additional arguments to consider. First, many agricultural exports
from Africa are subsidized or benefit from artificially high international prices.
Second, many African countries also have little to gain from a trade agreement
because under the EU Everything But Arms programme African LDCs have
duty free quota free access to the EU market. Many sub-Saharan countries
have Duty Free Quota Free access to markets in developed countries under
Economic Partnership Agreements. These facts limit the gains to be obtained
from a successful trade agreement.
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The reduction of tariffs and the growth of world trade are clear evidence
that the rounds of trade talks have been successful. At least part of this success
has arisen from the existence of mutual gains to be exploited. These gains
have been realized in the trade between developed countries. The Doha Round
intentionally set out to help developing countries. The interests of developed
and developing countries can be very different so it may be hard to find mutual
gains. More likely, aiding the developing countries will probably have to involve
losses by the developed countries. It is therefore not surprising that the history
of successful talks is now confronted with this round of talks that failed to make
progress.
4 Corruption and Compliance
4.1 The effects of Corruption on growth
Corruption has clearly a negative impact on investment and growth. A pay-
ment of a bribe to get an investment license reduces the incentive to invest.
Moreover, the bribe payment in the taxation system of many countries is not
tax deductible from taxable investment. So bribe payment for investment is
particularly harmful for risk-taking. Another adverse effect of corruption is that
rent seeking crowds out productive investment. When tax revenues aimed for
productivity enhancing infrastructure or human capital investment are diverted
for politicians’ private benefit, growth rate will decline. Even worse, higher bibes
imply that productive investment becomes less profitable relative to rent seeking
activity. Murphy et al. (1993) argue that in general when there is slow growth,
the return to productive investment fall relative to rent seeking activity and
the resulting expansion in rent seeking activities further slows down growth.
Besides, investors and entrepreneurs are at the mercy of corrupt public officials
to obtain permits and licenses for new products that are not needed for existing
products. This is a serious barrier to innovation. Corruption as a tax on ex-post
profits may stifle entry of new products and technology which require an fixed
cost investment. Some of the adverse effects of corruption on growth have been
confirmed empirically in the work of Mauro (1995). Using cross-country data on
corruption rankings in 70 countries Mauro (1995) finds a negative correlation
between corruption index and the investment rate or growth rate. Improving
by one standard deviation the corruption index (i.e. less corruption) increases
the investment rate by 3 percent of GDP. What about the impact of growth
on corruption? It is fair to say that for some countries with the process of in-
dustrialization and growth, corruption may have got worst first for some time
before getting better. This is a sort of inverted U-shaped curve of corruption
similar to the Kuznets curve linking economic inequality to income per capita.
There is also the environmental Kuznets curve positing an inverted U-shaped
relationship between pollution and per capita income. The driving force is that
as the economy expands in the earlier stages of development, the markets re-
main thin for many goods and services giving the opportunity to public officials
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to milk the process for granting monopoly right, licenses and franchises. But be-
long a certain point in the economic expansion, the process of economic growth
ultimately generates forces to reduce corruption. Rewards for productive invest-
ment relative to rent seeking activities increase when there is sustained growth.
A richer economy can also afford to better pay its civil servants, reducing their
motivation for corruption. The democratic reforms will set up institutions that
build mechanisms of accountability and transparency at different levels which
eventually trickle down the network of corruption. The result is a better of
"enforcement" of laws and rules, even though the "making" of laws and rules
remains under the influence of money.
4.2 The effects of Corruption on tax collection
Corruption has also adverse effect on the static efficiency of tax and revenue
collection in developing countries. As the IMF (2012) suggests a major revenue
loss is related to extractive sector. An increasing number of African countries are
searching and discovering natural resources and how those resource revenue is
shared between the government and the private investors is important for poor
countries. The tax treatment of mining industries varies widely across countries
by mixing royalties, taxes on rents and on business profits. The rent sharing
agreement varies also a lot across countries with sometimes a very low share for
the government. The IMF (2012) estimates that on average governments retain
about 30% of the revenue in the mining sector. The fact that agreements in
the extractive sector are often ad-hoc and not transparent is a major risk for
corruption. Indeed when the deal is negotiated directly between politicians and
big companies, outside the tax system and without accountability mechanisms
(check and balance), the potential for corruption and for lower retention of rev-
enue for the country, in exchange for political benefits, can be very high. It is
therefore essential to design transparent rules and guidelines that prevents the
proliferation of ad-hoc arrangements (e.g. the non discrimination rule). The
purpose is to design fiscal regimes and rent sharing agreements that ensure a
fair amount of revenue for the country that can be reinvested in the develop-
ment of productivity-enhancing infrastructure, human capital and health care
investments. The objective for tax administration in the tax enforcement is to
ensure that the probability of detecting non-compliance and the penalty that is
inflicted on the tax evaders are high enough to enforce compliance. At the same
time effective enforcement policy must support and reflect general willingness to
follow the rules and comply with the laws. The real difficulty is to pursue effec-
tive enforcement at the least cost to the taxpayer (compliance cost) as well as for
the tax administration (administration cost). Collusive corruption between the
inspector and the taxpayer may hinder tax enforcement. That form of corruption
is more insidious and more difficult to detect because it is a secret arrangement
between them to share some taxable income away from the government. This
"collusive" corruption is also more contagious and persistent in the sense that it
depends crucially on the number of other people we expect to be corrupt. The
benefit of an honest official is higher when very few officials are corrupt, but it
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declines as the number of corrupt officials increases. To put it simply it does
not pay to be corrupt when everyone else is honest , but it does not pay to be
honest when everyone else is corrupt. Suppose some administration hierarchy,
the probability to be detected when corrupt and to be sacked diminishes with
the general level of corruption in the administration. Corruption at each level
of the hierarchy feeds on the other. The punishment declines as more officials
become corrupt. To inverse this perverse circle we need a "crack down" policy to
create the critical mass of honest officials in the hierarchy which in turn triggers
a chain reaction by which honesty will progressively feed on the other officials.
It is worth saying that this type of corruption goes beyond tax enforcement to
include many cases of officials leniency with quality control, safety regulations
in building, food and drug controls, pollution controls...
4.3 How to fight corruption
There are different solutions to combat corruption. The first is to eliminate ex-
cessive regulation and bureaucratic allocations of resources that feed corruption.
Getting rid of many of the dysfunctional regulations. One of the most harm-
ful form of corruption is predatory regulation. This is the process by which
the government creates regulations that entrepreneurs have to pay bribe to get
around. Because it raises the cost of production activity, this form of corruption
is damaging the economy and slows down growth. This damage becomes larger
when several government officials, acting independently, create separate regula-
tory conditions to economic activity so that each can collect a distinct bribe in
return for authorizing the activity. When entrepreneurs face all these indepen-
dent regulatory obstacles, they stop trying or move to underground economy
to escape regulation altogether. Cutting down on the proliferation functions
of government using vouchers and competition with private suppliers to serve a
public need. In doing so we must trade off the benefit of reducing the corruption
against the social value of the regulation itself. Food rationing can be organized
by the public officials so that the poor can have access to it but with the risk
of corruption. When organized by the market , the poor may lose access to this
essential good. When fighting corruption with deregulation we should not lose
sight of the social objective the regulation was supposed to serve. In that per-
spective, it is no surprising that structural adjustment programs in developing
countries have been so unpopular when trying to eliminate the corrupt public
administration in the food distribution.
A second solution is to break down the monopoly power of the government
by introducing competition and the possibility for people to vote with their
feet. Also the overlapping involvement of local, state and federal agencies in
controlling illegal activities may reduce corruption at each level. Obviously
competition in the provision of public services has to be accompanied by more
intense monitoring and auditing.
A third solution to corruption is to set up various accountability mecha-
nisms such as an independent office of public auditing, independent investi-
gating agencies, watchdog committees providing information and monitoring
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services, a vigorous and independent press, making supervisors answerable for
act of malfeasance by their subordinates, procedures for encouraging"whistle-
blowers", working on teams in facing a customer so that there is some check in
the bargaining, periodic job rotation so that bureaucrat does not become too
costly with a customer over time.
A fourth solution is the important policy issue of incentive pay structure.
This is one of the most effective ways of fighting corruption because to say sim-
ply you cannot give public officials power and require them to live in penury (see
Klitgaard (1988)). The efficiency wage theory suggests to pay a wage premium
above private wage so that the fear of job loss on detection may stiffen pub-
lic officials resistance to temptation for corruption. International organizations
when pushing for structural adjustment and budget cut in the public sector may
trigger lower wages for public officials increasing their incentive for corruption.
Hindriks et al. (1999) have shown that inducing honesty in the collection of pro-
gressive taxes can be costly, implying an additional source of inefficiency associ-
ated with the pursuit of equity. Intuitively, the government can levy progressive
taxes without reducing its own revenue by creating countervailing incentives in
the form of commissions: the tax inspector and the taxpayer are tempted to
understate income to evade progressive taxes, and tempted to overstate income
(extortion) to raise the commission payments. Striking a right balance between
the two involves a real resource cost. In fact it is shown that a government that
is concerned only to maximize revenue, eliminating altogether corruption and
evasion, can do no better than set a proportional tax schedule and pay inspec-
tors a fixed wage with penalties proportional to the extent of mis-reporting. The
reason for such a simple incentive scheme is nothing to do with distortion on
taxpayer effort or administrative simplicity: it is as a means of ensuring honesty
in tax collection. The central message is that there is never any strict gain from
paying commissions for tax collection. There is no commission just to deter the
inspector from abusing his discretionary power through the threat of extortion
to extract bribe from the tax payer.
A last comment on corruption is about the role of the sate. Following the
rent seeking approach, the sate is predatory by nature, and the less state there
is the better. But this approach does not help to understand why corruption
is more important in some countries than in others. In fact governments in
some developing countries became predatory not because they were powerful,
but because they were weak: the state could not enforce the laws and property
rights that provides the minimal prerequisite of a market economy, and as a
result the state increases the cynicism about corruption among public officials.
Disrespect quickly led to dishonesty. Weak and fragmented governments can
hardly control corruption.
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4.4 The ghosts and the icebergs
The conventional wisdom is that informal activities are the main tax challenge in
discussion of taxation and development. But as Kanbur (2009) pointed out this
term lack a minimal conceptual clarity and coherence in the analytic literature
and so that literature (on informality) as a whole is in a mess. The reason is
that it simply fails to evoke with much clarity and coherence the key issues of
compliance that are the real challenge. To understand this point just consider
the many small firms and street traders. They are mostly operating in the so-
called informal sector defined in somewhat vague sense of not being subject to
tax and other government restrictions. But in tax terms it is fare from obvious
those firms should be taxed anyway. When balancing the revenue foregone by
excluding them from tax against the administrative and compliance cost to the
tax payer from including them, the final decision may well that they should not
be taxed (excepted indirectly through taxes such as the VAT on their purchases).
Thus the issue of informality is not that much important to the extent that the
optimal tax by such small operators should be zero. More important for the
tax agenda is the issue of tax evasion, both in term of revenue mobilization
and of the fairness of the overall tax system. Those tax evaders are not in
the informal sector at all but they are highly visible professionals such as civil
servant, doctors, lawyers, architects and other highly qualified subject to a range
of professional restrictions.
They are also the medium and large corporations in the agricultural sector,
the extractive sector and the banking sector. The informal sector issue is not
very relevant nor useful to mobilize tax revenue in developing countries. More
useful is the concentration on the hard-to-tax to stress that the real issue is
non-compliance and its dependence on the tax policy and implementation. As
suggested by Keen (2012), "it is necessary to probe deeper into the anatomy
of non-compliance, and how tax design and implementation should reflect and
address it. These are complex issues, but facing them head on at least points
to potentially fruitful areas of inquiry and action" (p.16). It is useful to de-
part form the informal sector approach with the implicit assumption that there
should be serious attempt to tax them all, to make a clear distinction between
how to draw the line between the taxed and untaxed. In developed countries
many transactions and citizens are not taxed. We do not call them informal
activities.
When dealing with the hard-to-tax in a wider context, it makes a difference
whether non-compliance takes the form of "ghosts" (invisible taxpayers who do
not register to tax) and "icebergs" (taxpayers who register but under report
taxable income). Ghosts are much more prevalent in developing countries. Keen
(2012) reports that in Uganda about 50 percent of firms were failing to register
to tax administration. In the "ghosts" model the registration of the taxpayers is
the critical issue and defining the optimal threshold to register is crucial both in
terms of administration and compliance costs. In the "iceberg" model, the criti-
cal issue is to develop effective tax enforcement such as improving refunding for
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exporters and input purchases under VAT, tackling more effectively aggressive
tax planning by large multinationals. Reinforcing tax compliance is not only a
matter of tax administration, it is also a matter of tax policy. Tax exemptions
and tax differentiation (across persons, sectors and firms) for example create
opportunities for corruption. Another example is the use of withholding taxes
and more advanced tax collection schemes that can collect indirectly some tax
from those who may not be fully compliant, but also to the extent that with-
holding taxes are creditable against taxes they are failing to remit (see Boadway
and Sato (2009)). This is part of the logic of the value added tax: a retailer who
chose not to register, for instance, escape all tax under retail sales tax, but only
the tax on their own value added, provided it is charged by their suppliers,
under a VAT.
Many developing countries have a comparatively weak tax administration
and tax enforcement is a serious issue. This implies that taxes should be simple
with few scope for tax avoidance or evasion. Simple taxes are also relatively easy
to collect and enforce. Taxes on profits, personal income taxes and value added
taxes are all relatively complex and difficult to administer with many potential
loopholes and special regimes. It is therefore not that surprising that many de-
veloping countries have set up simple minimum tax scheme on broad and harder
to evade tax base. The best example is the turnover minimum tax schemes im-
plemented in many developing countries (see (EY, 2013)).Kleven et al. (2014),
using administrative data on bunching of taxpayers around the switching thresh-
old between profit and minimal turnover tax scheme in Pakistan, they estimate
that the turnover tax has reduced tax evasion by about 60 per cent of corporate
income and increases revenue by 74 per cent without reducing total profits. The
tax rate on the turnover tax is only 0.5% compared to a tax rate on profit of 35
per cent. However the turnover tax base is much larger than the profit tax base
and harder to evade. Broader tax bases encourage lower level of tax avoidance
and evasion. Obviously taxing turnover instead of profit introduces a distor-
tion in the production due to the multiple taxation of the same items along
the production chains. This is a violation of the Diamond-Mirrlees principle of
production efficiency but the benefit is a reduction in the compliance cost. The
so-called efficiency-compliance trade off can therefore justify some deviation of
production efficiency to reduce the cost of collecting taxes.
5 Tax Collection Efficiency
As mentioned in the introduction, domestic resource mobilization in developing
countries is at the center of the attention. It is thus essential for developing
countries to define the sources of the tax collection effectiveness (to extend
the taxable potential) and to be sure that the tax collection system is efficient
(to avoid losses). Generally, authors focus on total tax collection to study the
efficiency of a tax system. In this study we widen this approach by estimating the
collection systems efficiency of the different taxes. The following sub-sections
are dedicated to the construction of different efficiency indicators and to the
42
analysis of these indicators.
5.1 Determinants of Tax Collection
The aim of a tax efficiency indicator is to determine if tax potential is fully
exploited. In this perspective, it is crucial to assess correctly the tax revenue
potential controlling for the the most important factors driving tax collection.
Therefore, we construct a potential tax revenue as a function of the configura-
tions of different factors. We then compare this potential tax revenue with the
actual tax revenues. Obvioulsy the quality of the efficiency indicator will depend
on the relevance and the exhaustiveness of the factors taken into account in our
analysis. In a first step, it is thus essential to review the key determinants of
tax collection, that is those that are theoretically and empirically relevant and
significant.
5.1.1 Nominal GDP
The nominal GDP is the first factor used to assess the potential tax revenue. It
allows mainly to take into account the size of the formal economy. Only mar-
ket transactions can be taxed. So expansion of the market economy increased
GDP and tax revenue altogether. However, this input used independently does
not give any robust information on the efficiency of the tax system. In other
words, there are too many unknowns to conclude anything from this restricted
benchmark approach. The figure (5) highlights the type of ranking that can be
obtained from the tax system efficiency indicator constructed with the GDP as
input. From this ranking we may presume that the South African tax system
was the most efficient in the 2000s among the DGD’s partner countries. How-
ever, this presumption is conditional to the absence of other inputs affecting the
collection of the taxes. Poor conclusions may thus be drawn from this type of
indicator.
The collection of the different tax components depends on other factors than
the GDP level. It seems risky to draw conclusion simply from the comparison
of the collection levels of the different tax components. A lot of studies follow
this benchmark approach with the tax on goods and services’ collection levels
(Cnossen, 2014). The taxes on goods and services are flat taxes, i.e. taxes
with a constant marginal rate. They include taxes on sales (i.e., sales taxes and
VAT) and excise taxes. The VAT tax is designed to only tax the final consumer.
Having been recently introduced in most of the developing countries15, this tax
is in the center of the attention of the development organizations16. The VAT
Productivity efficiency indicator is defined as the ratio of VAT collected to GDP
level.The wide use of this simple indicator is made possible by the fact that
it is commonly accepted that this tax is easier to administer than direct taxes
15Ebrill (2001) pointed out that VAT (or a VAT-like tax) can be found in 116 countries
around the world in 1998.
16According to Tanzi and Zee (2000), the introduction of VAT over the past few decades
has been the most visible tax reform undertaken by developing countries.
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Figure 5: First Ranking for DGD’s partner countries
(Piccolino et al., 2014). VAT revenues are also less sensitive to the size of the
informal market17 than are direct and other indirect taxes.
The graph (6) reflects the VAT productivity indicator for DGD’s partner
countries. The horizontal dashed line being the worldwide average, we observe
that most of the DGD’s partner countries have a VAT system less efficient
than the worldwide average. On the other hand, Bolivia has a VAT system
really efficient according to this indicator. Comparing to the graph (5), we
observe that the two indicators are not similarly distributed. For example, the
graph(5), suggests that the Beninese tax system is quite efficient while the VAT
productivity displays low performance.
17It enables the informal sector to be taxed on all the intermediary goods coming from the
formal sector (Boadway and Sato, 2009).
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Figure 6: VAT Productivity
5.1.2 GDP per capita
As for the nominal GDP, it is reasonable to presume that the average GDP per
capita affects the collection of taxes. Wealthier agents are expected to be able
to contribute relatively more to tax revenue. More widely, the GDP per capita
is a useful proxy of inputs impacting the tax collection such as the population
growth, the capacities of the tax administration or the size of the informal sector.
This is double-edged argument, with the consequence of mixing up the effect of
different factors. Used separately, this variable allows to explain approximately
one third of the variation of the total tax revenue in proportion of GDP18.
5.1.3 Spatial dependence
The map (7) suggests some spatial dependence in the distribution of tax revenue.
This spatial dependence may be explained by the geographical trade agreements,
as well as driven by the mobility and the local competition for goods, services
and production factors. These external competition forces pushe for more tax
convergence. Another explanation is the contagion effect of tax administration
(in)efficiency. The efficiency of tax collection may depend on the tax system of
the neighbor’s countries. This argument may be illustrated by a simple example
with the VAT tax. Let’s imagine two countries (A and B) producing both goods
bought by final consumers of country B. The country B has an efficient VAT
system, controlling for the VAT collection at every stage of the production chain
while the country A has a poor VAT system. In country B, the monitoring
system between intermediary producers and the frequent controls allow to limit
the incentive to avoid the VAT. In country A, the risk to be controlled is quasi
18We observe a R squared of 0.33 for a regression of 117 countries of the mean total tax
revenue (in % of GDP) on the mean GDP per capita during the 2000s.
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Variable I coefficient Z score p-value
Total Tax 0.444 11.243 0.000
PIT Tax 0.430 9.592 0.000
Trade Tax 0.292 7.833 0.000
Tax on Goods and Services 0.506 12.415 0.000
Table 11: Moran’I statistic
nonexistent and intermediary producers avoid the VAT to push their sales. The
price of the final good (ready to be sold to the final consumer) is equal to 1
in country A and equal to 1+VAT in country B. If the good of country A is
illegally imported, the seller may thus increase substantially its profits. It may
thus exist incentives to import goods illegally (without paying VAT on imports)
from country A to country B impacting the effectiveness of the tax system in
country B. This is related to the contagion effect discussed earlier in respect
with corruption and compliance.
(.2525791,.474824]
(.1727733,.2525791]
(.0929675,.1727733]
[.007025,.0929675]
No data
Total Tax /GDP
Figure 7: Tax Revenues Collected in the 2000s
The variable that we use to take into account the spatial dependence is called
the “spatial lag”. The idea is to construct for each geographical entity a fictive
entity that summarize its neighborhood. The weight given to the neighbor
entities is inversely proportionate to the distance that separate them to the
studied entity. We use the Moran’s I statistic to determine if a variable is
significantly auto-correlated with its “spatial lag”. The spatial dependence of
the total tax revenue is statistically significant (see table (11)). In the efficiency
equation the spatial dependence input is taken into account through the spatial
lag of the total tax collected.
The decomposition of the tax structure allows to be more precise in regard
to the policy advices concerning the efficiency of the tax systems. The table
(11) shows that all the tax components are spatially dependent. However, the I
coefficients are far from being equal. We see for example that the explanatory
power of the goods and services’ spatial lag is higher than the corporate taxes’
spatial lag.
46
5.1.4 Non Tax Revenues
Governments can generally count on other sources of revenue than tax collection.
Among those sources of revenues we distinguish two main groups: the grants and
the natural resources revenues (from taxes or not). Those sources of revenue are
suspected of having an impact on domestic revenue. We introduce the concept
of “rentier state” to apprehend this problematic. According to Moore (2004),
rentier states live largely off unearned income. Unlike fiscal or tax states, the
rentier state is resourced with little organizational or political effort and has
poor relations with its domestic population. Numerous authors have studied
the impact of aid on tax effort although the conclusions are far from similar.
First, many studies have concluded that aid discourages tax effort (Remmer
(2004);Gupta et al. (2003); Gupta et al. (2003); Knack (2008); Crivelli et al.
(2012)). Second, Gupta et al. (2003) have shown that the composition of the
aid matters: loans that have to be repaid encourage tax effort whereas grants
do not. Crivelli et al. (2012) have replicated and expanded this study with a
larger dataset and found similar results. Moreover, they pointed out that the
negative impact of aid is larger in weak institutional environments. Finally,
some authors obtained divergent results and noted that aid has become positive
since 1980s (Clist and Morrissey (2011) and Clist (2014)). In the same order
of ideas, Piccolino et al. (2014) found that aid leads to democratization and
that there is an indirect and mediated link between democracy and extractive
capacity. Like grants, natural resources may have an impact on the exploitation
of other sources of revenue. In the literature, it has been widely accepted that
natural resources discourage tax effort (Bornhorst et al. (2008); Morrissey et al.
(2014)). In the estimation of potential tax revenue this effect is is taken into
account through a variable summing all the non-tax revenues.
The study of each component of the tax structure has to be accompanied
with variables controlling for the potential tax shifting effect. A striking case is
the tax shift from trade to goods and services tax that occurred in developing
countries. Indeed, different developing countries have abandoned import tariffs
and are now relying much more on taxes on goods and services. Among the
DGD countries, Mali and Tanzania are examples of this shift. In Mali, the large
increase of the taxes on goods and services was mainly due to an increase of the
VAT revenues (+4%) but also to an increase of the excises revenues (+1.5%).
This tax shift may be called a policy shift as it arises from a policy decision. On
the other hand it is also possible to observe some compliance shifts. Those shifts
emanate from the taxpayer. For example, if it exists large differences between
PIT and CIT rates, companies may report personal income as corporate income
in disguise to benefit from a lower CIT rate. (Tanzi and Zee (2000) and Arnold
et al. (2011)).
5.1.5 Government Effectiveness
It is straightforward that the quality of the government affects the effectiveness
of the tax system. We already discussed that point in the section on corruption
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and tax efficiency. By quality we mean the degree of independence the tax ad-
ministration from political pressures but also the quality of policy formulation
and implementation. For example, complex tax system, made up of many rate
brackets, personal exemptions and deductions are generally less effective (Tanzi
and Zee (2000); Cnossen (2014))19 . More widely, the quality of the administra-
tion will generally depend on the quality of human capital and on the available
infrastructure (telephone, Internet, etc.).
The need in administrative capacities to collect tax vary also between tax
items. For example, authors agree that indirect taxes are easier to adminis-
ter than direct taxes (Piccolino et al., 2014). Direct taxes require an active
bargaining with the taxpayers. This bargaining is not facilitated in economies
with large informal sector composed of a high number of small establishments.
This point is clearly confirmed by the tax reform in Pakistan where the switch
from CIT to a simple turn over tax has increased revenue by about 70 percent
without reducing production (see Kleven et al 2014).
5.1.6 Other factors
Briefly, several other inputs are presumed to have an impact on the tax systems
effectiveness. First, the openness affects the tax collection (Rodrik (1996); Pi-
ancastelli (2001); Norregaard and Khan (2007); Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009)).
The impact of openness may vary by type of tax. High openness index may
damage the CIT collection because of the “rate race to the bottom” existing
to attract firms while indirect tax collection may be favored because the in-
19Note that, according to Keen et al. (2008), the complexity of the tax does not come from
the number of brackets but from the number of exemptions.
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ternational trade facilitates the taxation of goods20. Besides, the production
structure may impact the effectiveness of the tax collection system. In the liter-
ature, it is commonly accepted that it is relatively harder to tax the agricultural
sector. Subsistence farmers are also often exempted which limits the tax base
and the tax collected (Leuthold (1991); Tanzi (1992); Piancastelli (2001)).
5.2 Tax Efficiency Indicator
The commonly used indicator of tax system efficiency is a cross-country com-
parison of the total tax collected as a share of GDP. However,Musgrave (1987)
and Le et al. (2008) show that this approach is reasonable for group of countries
with similar economic structure and the same level of development. In other
words, other variables have to be taken into account to construct the efficiency
indicator (those variables are listed in the previous sections). In addition, the
decomposition of the tax structure allows to construct a more useful tool for
the policy maker than the general approach. In this study, to construct the tax
efficiency indicator, we first estimate the taxable capacity of each country. This
taxable capacity is estimated with a regression analysis where the explanatory
variables are the factors presumed to affect the tax potential21. The efficiency
indicator is defined by comparing the tax potential with the actual tax col-
lected. Different indicators result from this approach. For example, the ratio
between the actual tax and the potential tax is called the “tax effort” (see Le
et al. (2008) and Le et al. (2012)). Our contribution to this approach is twofold.
First, we take into account in the estimation the spatial variable to capture
the geographic shift (contagion effect). Secondly, the decomposition of the tax
structure enables us to capture the interaction between tax components due
to policy shift (tax shifts). This approach, made possible by the existence of
the new “ICTD Government Revenue Dataset” (ICTD GRD), covers a 10 years
period (2000-2010) and includes 110 developing and developed countries. We
perform cross-country regressions rather than panel regressions to avoid any
spurious regression caused by the non-stationarity of the variables. In this way,
we also avoid to deal with the black boxes generated by the country fixed effects.
5.2.1 Empirical Specification, Variables, and Methodology
In this study we propose models with different specifications to assess the effi-
ciency of the total tax collection and its different tax components:
-The equation to estimate the taxable potential for the total tax system in
the 2000s is:
TotTaxi
Gdpi
= α0 + α1Gdpci + α2W (dep)i + α3Openi + α4Agri + α5Govi + α6NonTaxi + εi
20In an economy with important informal sector the easy to collect border taxes guaranteed
a minimal taxation on goods.
21The regression approach has been used by different authors. See Lotz and Morss (1967),
Bahl (1971), Le et al. (2008), Le et al. (2012).
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-The equations to estimate the taxable potential of the different tax compo-
nents in the 2000s are:
Xi = β0 + β1Gdpci + β2W (dep)i + β3Openi + β4Agri + β5Govi + β6NonTaxi +
∑
βOTaxi + εi
The tax components denoted by Xi are:
PITi/Gdpi is the average personal income tax revenue in percentage of GDP
(sources: ICTD GRD, IMF WEO);
Tradei/Gdpiis the average trade tax revenue in percentage of GDP (sources:
ICTD GRD, IMF WEO);
GSi/HConsiis the average tax on goods and services revenue in percentage
of the nominal household consumption expenditure (NPISHs included) (sources
IFS IMS).
For the various regressions we use the same set of independent variables.
Obviously the estimates coefficients will vary for the different tax components.
TotTaxi/Gdpi is the average total tax revenue in percentage of GDP (sources:
ICTD GRD, IMF WEO) ;
Gdpci is the average GDP per capita in purchasing-power-parity (PPP).
This variable is expressed in logarithm in the equations (source IMF IFS);
W (dep)i is the spatial lag of the dependent variable;
Openi is the average measures for trade openness (exports plus imports in
percentage of GDP) (source: IMF IFS);
Agri is the average share of agriculture in the total production (source:
World Bank);
Govi is the average measure for the governance effectiveness (It “reflects per-
ceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formu-
lation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to such policies.” Governance effectiveness index are reported as index number
from 1 to 6. While 1 indicates the lowest governance effectiveness, 6 indicates
the highest governance effectiveness) (source: World Bank WGI);
NonTaxi is the average of the Non-Tax Revenues. (sources: ICTD GRD);
OTaxi stands for the average of tax revenues not included in the dependent
variable;
The correlation matrix (see appendices) confirms the sign expected between
our variables of interest. The total tax collection in percentage of GDP is
positively correlated with the GDP per capita, its spatial lag, the trade openness
and the governance efficiency 22. On the other hand, it is negatively correlated
with the agriculture share and the non-tax revenues. The personal income
22For the GDP per capita, the trade openness and the governance efficiency, the results are
along the same lines as the correlation reported in Le et al. (2008) and Le et al. (2012). The
other variables have not been used in those two reference papers.
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tax revenue in percentage of GDP is positively correlated with the GDP per
capita, the governance efficiency, its spatial lag, the trade openness, the tax
collection on goods and services, the SSC revenues and the CIT revenues. On
the other hand, PIT collection is negatively correlated the agriculture share
and the trade tax revenues. Finally, the GS revenues in percentage of the
household consumption is positively correlated with the GDP per capita, its
spatial lag, the trade openness, the governance efficiency, and all the other tax
revenues excepted the trade tax revenues. The GS revenues are also negatively
correlated with the agriculture share and the non-tax revenues. The regression
is an ordinary least square regression for cross section. As mentioned by Bird
et al. (2014) and Le et al. (2012) who use similar specification for panel data,
it may exist a problem of endogeneity or dual causality within institutional
variables and tax revenues variable. However, Bird et al. (2014) have tested and
rejected any simultaneity of tax revenues and institutional variable.
5.2.2 Estimation of The Tax Potential
The estimations of the tax potential resulting from the specifications given in
the previous equations are presented in the table (12). The tax potential has
been estimated for the total tax as well as its three tax components (PIT, GS
tax and Trade Tax). Excepted for Trade Taxes, we observe that the model has
a good prediction power, in the sense that it can explain between 0.6 and 0.7
of the variance of the dependent variables (r-squared are comprise between 0.6
and 0.7). We do not consider the CIT because its tax potential is too difficult to
predict23. The first equation of each model shows that the spatial dependence
strongly impacts the tax collection. The main determinants of the tax collection
are mostly the governance effectiveness and the economic structure. We see
that the tax collection is lower in countries where primary sector’s production
represents an important share of the total production. Striking enough, the
GDP per capita is not significant. This is explained by the introduction of the
governance effectiveness variable that captures most of the explanatory power
of the development level variable (Le et al., 2012). The variables impacting the
the PIT collection are mostly the same as the variables impacting the total tax
collection (i.e. the spatial dependence, the efficiency of the fiscal administration
and the agriculture share). Moreover, we see that the collection of other taxes
has also a strong incidence on the PIT collection. The collection of GS taxes
impacts positively the PIT system while the collection of SSC seems to damage
the PIT collection. This negative sign typically highlights the tax shift that may
occur between those two comparable taxes. The model for the GS tax system
gives the most striking results. First, the importance of the spatial dependence
and the agriculture share is again confirmed. Secondly, the negative coefficient
of the trade taxes collection highlights the importance to take account for the
existence of tax shift between tax components. Third, the trade openness’
coefficient is positive as expected. As already mentioned, international trade
23For CIT revenues, our model specification gives a r-squared below 0.25.
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Dependent variable Total tax PIT GS tax Trade tax
Constant 0.206* -0.014 0.131 -0.101
GDP per capita -0.016 0.001 -0.009 -0.009
Spatial lag of dep. 0.736*** 0.804*** 0.490*** 0.472***
Trade openness 0.018 -0.009 0.021* 0.033***
Non-Tax revenue -0.151 0.061 -.0176** -0.081
Governance efficiency 0.026*** 0.017*** -0.000 -0.007
Agriculture value added -0.002** 0.000 -0.001** -0.001**
GS tax 0.158*** -0.173***
PIT 0.386*** -0.055*
SSC -0.212*** 0.218 -0.010
CIT -0.201 0.736** -0.055
Trade tax 0.099 -0.398***
Observations 115 115 115 115
R-squared 0.60 0.67 0.71 0.44
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 12: Determinants of Tax Collection in the 2000s
favors GS tax collection because GS taxes are easier to collect at the border.
Finally, the negative coefficient of the non-tax collection variable highlights the
revenue shifting that may occur in well-endowed countries.
5.2.3 Estimation of the tax effort
Total Tax Collection Indicator The tax effort is the ratio of the actual tax
to the potential tax. The ranking of the tax effort indicators are reported in the
appendices.
In the figure (9), all the points under the 45° diagonal represent countries
for which the total tax collection is under the taxable potential or in other
words that may improve their collection tax effort. We observe that developing
countries (LICs and MICs) have lower potentials and lower actual levels of total
tax collection than developed countries. Several countries of the two group may
improve the efficiency of their tax systems. The two best countries -i.e. with an
actual total tax collection much over its predicted potential- are Denmark and
Lesotho.
The figure (10) allows to classify DGD’s partner countries into different
groups, based on their tax effort and actual tax collection. Those groups are
determined by the two perpendicular dashed lines. The horizontal line repre-
sents the median level of total tax collection for the 115 countries studied while
the vertical line separate countries according to their average tax effort (below
average or above average).
DGD’s partner countries that collect few taxes and that lies below their re-
spective tax potential are considered to under-perform in their tax collection.
These countries are Mozambique, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Niger.
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Figure 9: Actual and Potential Total Tax Collection, average over the 2000s
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Figure 10: Tax Effort (Total Tax)
53
DNK
45°
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Ac
tu
al
 P
IT
 /G
DP
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Potential PIT /GDP
Developing Countries Developed Countries
Figure 11: Actual and Potential PIT Collection, average over the 2000s
Administration and fiscal reforms focusing on revenue enhancement should al-
low these countries to increase their tax revenues. On the opposite, countries
that have high tax effort and high actual tax collection (typically Morocco) are
considered to over-perform in tax collection. In their situation, an increase of
the tax revenue may distort wastefully the economy. Finally, countries with high
tax effort and still low actual tax collection (Mali, Benin and Burundi) suffer
from evasion, inefficient administration and narrow bases. According to Le et al.
(2012) those countries seem to fall into a “trap” and the “More likely explanation
for this trap is the net over exploitation of some revenue sources through high
tax rates used as a tool to overcome tax erosion resulted from a widespread
preferential treatment to economic sectors and activities. A sustained approach
to break this trap is to conduct important parallel reforms—creating favorable
legal and regulatory environment to attract private investment and at the same
time revamping the tax systems to cut collection costs and minimize tax-induced
economic distortions and hurdle to investment; and most importantly focusing
on reforms to improve the quality of governance”.
PIT Collection Indicator The figure (11) shows that the potential PIT is
very low for most of the developing countries. Different developed countries have
actual PIT much higher than their potential. The study of this tax component
give complementary information. For example, we can say that the efficiency
of the Danish tax system may be partially explained by its good PIT collection
system while it seems not to be the case for Lesotho.
GS Tax Collection Indicator In the figure (13), we observe that the distri-
bution of the potential and actual GS taxes collection are not much depending
on the development level. Besides, the high majority of countries collect too few
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Figure 13: Actual and Potential GS Taxes Collection, average over the 2000s
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Figure 14: Tax Effort (GS)
taxes on GS while the most serious cases concern developed countries. About
10 countries have an efficient GS collection system and they are all developing
countries.
Trade Tax Collection Indicator In figure (15), we observe that trade tax
is the unique tax component for which the potential and the actual collection
level is higher in developing countries than developed countries. The Lesotho
and Swaziland have the highest trade tax collection peaking at more than 25%
of GDP for Lesotho. Antigua-et-Barbuda and Russia are the only developed
countries that count on high trade taxes collection.
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Figure 16: Tax Effort (Trade)
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Figure 15: Actual and Potential Trade Taxes Collection, average over the 2000s
5.2.4 Special focus on DGD’s partner countries:
Burundi: The Burundian’s total tax collection is under the average of DGD’s
partner countries. The tax collection is deemed by a weak administration and
a high share of agriculture in GDP. Besides, its tax effort index is the highest of
DGD’s partners. In other words, in view of its weak resources, Burundi has a
highly efficient tax collection system. Besides, we observe that Burundi makes
strong efforts to collect each of the tax components studied. Especially, for a
government of comparable quality, countries are not expected to collect so much
PIT.
Benin: Benin and Brundi are quite comparable in term of level of tax collec-
tion and tax effort (Benin is slightly better endowed than Burundi and its total
tax collection is higher). However, the efficiency indicators of the tax compo-
nents show that Benin counts on a really efficient trade tax system. Its effort to
collect the PIT being low, some increase of the tax collection may appear from
a reform of the PIT system.
Bolivia: Bolivia collects more taxes than the majority of the DGD’s partners
and this is mainly explained by its better endowment (in term of structural
characteristics). Besides, its tax collection level is slightly higher that what is
expected for a comparable endowment. This high tax effort is mostly explained
by the efforts done to collect GS taxes. On the opposite, the PIT system seems
to be particularly inefficient in Bolivia. By reforming its PIT system, Bolivia
may diversify its sources of revenues.
Morocco: The high level of tax collection in Morocco seems to be explained
by both its structural characteristics and its tax effort. Considering the quality
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of its administration, Morocco seems to collect particularly high level of tax. As
for Benin, this result is dependent on the trade tax collection. In other words,
the tax effort is swollen by the important collection of trade taxes that do not
really depend on the administration quality (see table 12). In fact, Morocco
just need to re-allocate its resources (i.e. reform its PIT and GS systems) to
collect more taxes.
Mali: The Malian’s case is similar to the Beninese’s case, i.e. large total tax
effort and poor tax revenues. Its tax effort being also swollen by the trade taxes
collection, Mali has the potential to increase its taxes collection by re-defining its
PIT system. This reform may be enhanced by the Malian’s neighbor countries
that have much more efficient PIT systems. Besides, Mali having particularly
weak administration, the expected impact would be much more important if the
reform were accompanied by some improvements in this sense.
Mozambique: Mozambique collects few taxes and has a low tax effort index.
There is some consistency among the tax effort indicators of Mozambique since
they are all low. This country should concentrate its efforts in reforming the
PIT and Trade taxes systems.
Niger: Niger collects few taxes and has a poor tax effort index. The country
may significantly increase its tax collection by reforming its GS and personal
income tax systems. In this case, the high level of trade tax does not really
impact the total tax effort because the GS tax collection is really low.
Peru: Peru collects few taxes and has a low effort index. This country has a
favorable production structure and a reasonably good administration but does
not draw benefits from its structural advantages. Peru should firstly make efforts
to reform its GS and trade tax systems.
Rwanda: Rwanda is characterized by few tax collection. This level of tax
collection is explained by its important share of agriculture in GDP, the poor
quality of its administration and its low level of trade openness. Rwanda is thus
expected to increase its tax collection by working on its structural characteristics
rather than by reforming the tax systems.
Senegal: Senegal has one of the most coherent tax system among the DGD’s
partner countries. This countries makes comparable effort to collect each of
the tax components. It can thus count on different sources of taxes and avoid
any dependency. The effectiveness of its tax system would be even enhanced if
its neighbor would improve their tax systems. In this sense, Senegal may have
incentive to lead a process of harmonization in the region.
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Tanzania and Uganda: The Tanzanian’s case is really similar to the Ugan-
dan’s one, i.e. poor tax collection but also poor tax efforts. In other words,
those countries have the potential to increase their tax collection by reforming
their different tax systems. The reform of the PIT system seems to be the most
urgent.
South Africa: South Africa is characterized by the largest total tax collection
among DGD’s partner countries. This level of tax collection is firstly explained
by the quality of its administration. Secondly, the country has a low share
of agriculture production and benefits of its favorable neighborhood. The tax
effort of South Africa is almost equal to one, meaning that the country allocate
efficiently its resources to collect taxes. Besides, South Africa could make some
stronger efforts to collect GS and Trade taxes to diversify its sources of revenue
and release its dependency to PIT collection.
Conclusion: The effort indicator for total tax collection may be misleading.
A high total tax effort index does not mean that all the taxes are efficiently
collected. Among the DGD’s partner countries, there are different examples of
countries with high total tax effort but low PIT tax effort index. It concerns
typically countries that remain with consequent trade tax system. PIT and
trade taxes being not incompatible (see table 12), it should be really beneficial
to reform the PIT system in those countries.
A World Bank’s classification of the world’s economies
Burundi Korea, Dem. Rep. Somalia
Afghanistan Guinea Nepal
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau Niger
Benin Haiti Rwanda
Burkina Faso Kenya Sierra Leone
Cambodia Liberia Tajikistan
African Republic Madagascar Tanzania
Chad Malawi The Gambia
Comoros Mali Togo
Eritrea Mozambique Uganda
Ethiopia Myanmar Zaire
Zimbabwe
Table 14: Low Income Countries
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Georgia Nicaragua Ukraine
Armenia Kiribati Samoa
Bhutan Kosovo Senegal
Bolivia Kyrgyz Republic Solomon Islands
Cabo Verde Lao P.D.R. South Sudan
Cameroon Lesotho Sri Lanka
Côte d’Ivoire Mauritania Sudan
Djibouti Micronesia Swaziland
Egypt Moldova Syria
El Salvador Mongolia São Tomé and Príncipe
FYR Macedonia Morocco Timor-Leste
Ghana Nigeria Uzbekistan
Guatemala Pakistan Vanuatu
Guyana Papua New Guinea Venezuela
Honduras Paraguay Vietnam
India Peru West Bank and Gaza
Indonesia Philippines Yemen
Islamic Republic of Iran Republic of Congo Zambia
Table 16: Middle Income Countries
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Barbados Italy Singapore
Brunei Darussalam Kuwait Spain
Andorra Germany Portugal
Antigua and B. Greece Puerto Rico
Aruba Hong Kong SAR Qatar
Australia Iceland Russia
Austria Ireland San Marino
Bahrain Israel Saudi Arabia
Belgium Japan Slovak Republic
Bermuda Korea Slovenia
Canada Latvia St. Kitts and Nevis
Cayman Islands Liechtenstein St. Martin
Channel Islands Lithuania Sweden
Chile Luxembourg Switzerland
Croatia Macao SAR, China The Bahamas
Cyprus Malta Trinidad and Tobago
Czech Republic Monaco Turks and Caicos Isl.
Denmark Netherlands United Arab Emirates
Equatorial Guinea New Zealand United Kingdom
Estonia Norway United States
Finland Oman Uruguay
France Poland
Table 18: High Income Countries
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B Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total tax (1) 1
GDP per capita (2) 0.56 1
Trade openess (3) 0.28 0.27 1
Informality index (4) -0.46 -0.62 -0.13 1
Agriculture share (5) -0.58 -0.69 -0.32 0.49 1
Non-Tax revenue (6) -0.09 0.32 0.12 -0.16 -0.21 1
Gov. efficiency (7) 0.64 0.81 0.19 -0.71 -0.71 0.01 1
GS tax (8) 0.71 0.68 0.26 -0.44 -0.61 -0.00 0.67 1
PIT (9) 0.79 0.58 0.14 -0.53 -0.48 0.03 0.72 0.58 1
SSC (10) 0.45 0.66 0.18 -0.45 -0.53 0.04 0.59 0.68 0.42 1
CIT (11) 0.37 0.51 0.17 -0.32 -0.45 0.27 0.37 0.36 0.24 0.18 1
Trade tax (12) 0.16 -0.37 0.22 0.20 0.16 -0.11 -0.35 -0.37 -0.16 -0.37 -0.15 1
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C Tax Effort Indicators
C.1 Total Tax and PIT
Rank Country
Tax Effort
Country
Tax Effort
Total Tax PIT
1 Lesotho 1.790292 Kazakhstan 15.05352
2 Denmark 1.700796 Sierra Leone 9.610889
3 Russia 1.589875 Zimbabwe 5.10864
4 Sierra Leone 1.5503 Zambia 2.692316
5 Australia 1.438792 Central African Republic 2.671872
6 Togo 1.386677 Ukraine 2.607476
7 Kenya 1.377422 Bangladesh 2.500644
8 Belarus 1.356827 Russia 2.186446
9 Brazil 1.341005 Kenya 2.157356
10 Burundi 1.33919 Suriname 2.134605
11 India 1.320828 Italy 2.050696
12 Jamaica 1.31624 Pakistan 1.955774
13 Argentina 1.312378 Guinea-Bissau 1.932047
14 Swaziland 1.306993 Denmark 1.903724
15 Benin 1.293104 Cape Verde 1.86266
16 Italy 1.278314 Belgium 1.677584
17 Mongolia 1.278154 Gambia, The 1.597182
18 Cote d’Ivoire 1.273887 Jamaica 1.567491
19 Sweden 1.265433 Sweden 1.557871
20 Iceland 1.254896 Papua New Guinea 1.54108
21 Serbia 1.251476 Yemen 1.49118
22 Nigeria 1.236107 South Africa 1.475839
23 Canada 1.223271 Japan 1.414004
24 Macedonia 1.22089 Burundi 1.385043
25 Cape Verde 1.219846 Swaziland 1.369714
26 Gabon 1.21929 Australia 1.345145
27 Namibia 1.208167 Hungary 1.329929
28 Central African Republic 1.197203 Peru 1.320208
29 Mali 1.193951 Namibia 1.317338
30 Cyprus 1.189963 Malawi 1.306302
31 Thailand 1.182994 Austria 1.259628
32 Senegal 1.176862 Serbia 1.232749
33 Barbados 1.151515 Lithuania 1.162701
34 Morocco 1.148346 Burkina Faso 1.154938
35 Ukraine 1.145773 Malaysia 1.145084
36 Papua New Guinea 1.127556 Switzerland 1.143881
37 Suriname 1.126434 Lesotho 1.121317
38 Kazakhstan 1.10474 Trinidad and Tobago 1.110338
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39 Malawi 1.102469 Thailand 1.107359
40 Equatorial Guinea 1.088598 Dominican Republic 1.081427
41 Hungary 1.065076 Canada 1.063368
42 Zimbabwe 1.059957 Germany 1.057797
43 Dominica 1.051749 Philippines 1.051
44 Austria 1.049718 United Kingdom 1.041586
45 Georgia 1.0448 Iceland 1.028323
46 Bolivia 1.042872 Spain 0.9972624
47 France 1.042242 Greece 0.9924762
48 United Kingdom 1.040375 Latvia 0.9868299
49 Belgium 1.037465 Estonia 0.9817437
50 Turkey 1.03639 Belarus 0.9753118
51 Fiji 1.026759 Turkey 0.9694158
52 Gambia, The 1.026452 France 0.9614186
53 Norway 1.013366 Nigeria 0.9517481
54 Sri Lanka 1.010275 Ghana 0.9314297
55 Korea, Republic of 1.008509 Georgia 0.9170421
56 Cameroon 1.005442 Barbados 0.9012283
57 Mauritania 1.001669 Slovenia 0.8797935
58 South Africa 1.000269 Mauritania 0.8747039
59 Bulgaria 0.9827114 Senegal 0.8719739
60 Ghana 0.9820138 Dominica 0.8573608
61 Croatia 0.9737083 Solomon Islands 0.8333929
62 Portugal 0.9727489 Poland 0.8188201
63 Nepal 0.9620448 United States 0.8069782
64 Zambia 0.961971 Morocco 0.8039926
65 Greece 0.9476725 Cameroon 0.7796854
66 Jordan 0.9285734 Mongolia 0.7698936
67 Armenia 0.9243039 Macedonia 0.7598547
68 Pakistan 0.923869 Ireland 0.7593212
69 Slovenia 0.9195493 Gabon 0.7506871
70 Albania 0.9119267 Czech Republic 0.7299634
71 Egypt 0.9111993 Azerbaijan 0.7174214
72 Solomon Islands 0.9075398 Tunisia 0.6928194
73 Spain 0.8962283 Rwanda 0.6917954
74 Grenada 0.8920955 Portugal 0.6917756
75 Uruguay 0.8712989 Benin 0.6902223
76 Dominican Republic 0.8673967 Korea, Republic of 0.6869256
77 Poland 0.8637618 Uruguay 0.6813383
78 Ireland 0.8378698 Netherlands 0.674691
79 Rwanda 0.834282 Mali 0.6681128
80 Japan 0.8329333 Bulgaria 0.6639324
81 Netherlands 0.8296612 Nepal 0.6556883
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82 Mauritius 0.8277333 Cyprus 0.6415626
83 Burkina Faso 0.826129 Guatemala 0.5940418
84 Tunisia 0.8156672 Argentina 0.587278
85 Antigua and Barbuda 0.8093086 India 0.5700753
86 Germany 0.8064305 Slovakia 0.562253
87 Lithuania 0.7992702 Fiji 0.5621792
88 Latvia 0.7989577 Armenia 0.5146419
89 Tanzania, United Republic of 0.7917549 Niger 0.508817
90 Switzerland 0.7897742 Egypt 0.5086537
91 Uganda 0.7842373 Uganda 0.5045064
92 Costa Rica 0.7804489 Costa Rica 0.4928082
93 Estonia 0.7791058 Croatia 0.4685567
94 Niger 0.7682172 Mozambique 0.4451407
95 Czech Republic 0.7503372 Bhutan 0.4253668
96 Philippines 0.7478477 Norway 0.4205834
97 Trinidad and Tobago 0.7432287 Tanzania, United Republic of 0.4053289
98 Guatemala 0.7385495 Iran 0.3662885
99 Syria 0.7319365 Albania 0.3277402
100 Bhutan 0.7277414 Sri Lanka 0.3267509
101 Malaysia 0.7206353 Syria 0.3254947
102 Chile 0.7190711 Mauritius 0.3001845
103 Azerbaijan 0.7147128 Madagascar 0.2828208
104 Peru 0.701131 Chile 0.2681009
105 United States 0.6931217 Jordan 0.2046763
106 Slovakia 0.6920311 Grenada 0.1848313
107 Mozambique 0.6771471 Bolivia 0.1358565
108 Yemen 0.6698669 Brazil 0.0987129
109 Bangladesh 0.667282 Antigua and Barbuda 0.0955554
110 Haiti 0.6416537 Togo -0.2702872
111 Guinea-Bissau 0.617784 Haiti -0.7155449
112 Madagascar 0.6137515 Equatorial Guinea -0.8011301
113 Cambodia 0.5744725 Panama -3.419372
114 Iran 0.5674087 Cambodia -3.870552
115 Panama 0.5268387 Cote d’Ivoire -12.51956
C.2 GS and Trade Taxes
Rank Country
Tax Effort
Country
Tax Effort
GS Tax Trade Tax
1 Nigeria 2.184255 Cyprus 64.63048
2 Lesotho 1.360646 Russia 19.06776
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3 Central African Republic 1.347503 Serbia 4.203267
4 Senegal 1.269784 India 3.655755
5 Sierra Leone 1.269515 Belarus 2.626621
6 Brazil 1.158155 Lesotho 2.531432
7 Burundi 1.134429 Benin 2.44057
8 India 1.109669 Sierra Leone 2.127471
9 Benin 0.9879498 Grenada 2.070246
10 Dominica 0.9865389 Albania 2.03616
11 Uganda 0.974996 Morocco 1.915145
12 Sri Lanka 0.9504456 Gabon 1.762843
13 Mali 0.9472573 The Gambia 1.762655
14 Cameroon 0.9379156 Swaziland 1.759235
15 Serbia 0.9345317 Mali 1.691894
16 Mauritius 0.9256504 Egypt 1.684267
17 Bolivia 0.9231839 Dominica 1.669066
18 Mongolia 0.9140995 Antigua & Barbuda 1.653772
19 Barbados 0.8838985 Namibia 1.619177
20 Malawi 0.8817975 Nepal 1.568339
21 Croatia 0.8777009 Chile 1.551106
22 Kenya 0.8746445 Niger 1.447731
23 Tanzania, United Republic of 0.8745644 South Korea 1.433531
24 Mauritania 0.8698528 Suriname 1.42088
25 Ghana 0.8583966 Iran 1.387808
26 Mozambique 0.845013 Nigeria 1.37366
27 Burkina Faso 0.8414401 Fiji 1.328013
28 Cyprus 0.8297397 Burundi 1.306654
29 Argentina 0.8110209 Central African Republic 1.206515
30 Rwanda 0.8071341 Togo 1.198447
31 Cote d’Ivoire 0.8071017 Australia 1.173949
32 Turkey 0.8039398 Macedonia 1.159991
33 Bulgaria 0.8035232 Syria 1.137142
34 Dominican Republic 0.7840751 Cape Verde 1.105606
35 Cape Verde 0.7786332 Cote d’Ivory 1.06797
36 Jordan 0.7774468 Madagascar 1.016092
37 Iceland 0.7608866 Azerbaijan 0.987155
38 Macedonia 0.757888 Jordan 0.9740186
39 Togo 0.7505509 Sri Lanka 0.9717271
40 Uruguay 0.7436452 Slovenia 0.8949147
41 Albania 0.737618 Pakistan 0.8858697
42 Portugal 0.7308396 Bangladesh 0.869692
43 Costa Rica 0.721527 Mauritius 0.8327512
44 Thailand 0.714571 Ghana 0.8286817
45 Fiji 0.7089047 Mongolia 0.8170388
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46 Belarus 0.7024368 Tunisia 0.8049122
47 Guatemala 0.7007431 Rwanda 0.7964361
48 Armenia 0.6907293 Bolivia 0.7872261
49 Jamaica 0.6873507 Kenya 0.7585911
50 Nepal 0.682471 Cameroon 0.7509986
51 Morocco 0.6824468 Senegal 0.7046925
52 Hungary 0.6808234 Dominican Republic 0.6830469
53 Azerbaijan 0.6568931 Barbados 0.6497377
54 Swaziland 0.6465395 Guinea-Bissau 0.633832
55 Namibia 0.6440057 Jamaica 0.6319358
56 Greece 0.6347194 Papua New Guinea 0.6057492
57 Chile 0.6325583 Poland 0.6041692
58 Slovenia 0.6249612 Ukraine 0.589114
59 Guinea-Bissau 0.6194381 Solomon Is. 0.5890107
60 South Africa 0.6150289 Mauritania 0.5836233
61 Denmark 0.6107665 Burkina Faso 0.5825089
62 Poland 0.6071347 Canada 0.5783558
63 Georgia 0.5998721 Philippines 0.5691828
64 Zambia 0.5962244 Yemen 0.5512767
65 Korea, Republic of 0.5870668 Czech Republic 0.5328557
66 Russia 0.5821065 Armenia 0.5256858
67 Estonia 0.5748396 Cambodia 0.5160452
68 Pakistan 0.5622029 Malawi 0.5077737
69 Trinidad and Tobago 0.5601246 Haiti 0.4913393
70 Canada 0.5530071 Thailand 0.4359077
71 Ukraine 0.5510568 Tanzania 0.4221101
72 Peru 0.5485287 Uganda 0.4125452
73 Latvia 0.5466531 Bulgaria 0.4093132
74 Tunisia 0.5448215 Trinidad & Tobago 0.3593597
75 Lithuania 0.5398818 Costa Rica 0.3577527
76 Austria 0.5322422 Mozambique 0.3488579
77 Australia 0.5304614 Zambia 0.3475773
78 Zimbabwe 0.5294926 Georgia 0.3385698
79 Norway 0.5263594 Guatemala 0.3363333
80 Slovakia 0.5255555 Zimbabwe 0.3351543
81 Netherlands 0.5249426 Peru 0.3236714
82 Gabon 0.521917 Kazakhstan 0.3210823
83 France 0.5214565 Panama 0.2682307
84 Solomon Islands 0.5110942 Malaysia 0.2349038
85 Sweden 0.5092831 Bhutan 0.2038279
86 United Kingdom 0.5008084 Hungary 0.1684104
87 Ireland 0.4967729 Latvia 0.1455569
88 Germany 0.4908569 South Africa 0.1300773
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89 Italy 0.4877249 Switzerland 0.1264199
90 Egypt 0.4728065 Slovakia 0.1145198
91 Czech Republic 0.4713567 Lithuania 0.1097089
92 Spain 0.4670841 Equatorial Guinea 0.0906241
93 Cambodia 0.4566624 United States 0.0152849
94 Grenada 0.4454779 Ireland 0.0005124
95 Kazakhstan 0.4363178 Sweden -0.000247
96 Bangladesh 0.4303049 Portugal -0.0006323
97 Belgium 0.4245314 Germany -0.0023758
98 Madagascar 0.4239744 Greece -0.0137676
99 Antigua and Barbuda 0.4202929 France -0.0161503
100 Bhutan 0.3961732 Norway -0.0236629
101 Suriname 0.3955671 Austria -0.0291665
102 Haiti 0.388995 Spain -0.0702952
103 Gambia, The 0.3832346 United Kingdom -0.1540898
104 Yemen 0.3754839 Iceland -0.2620372
105 Papua New Guinea 0.3691852 Brazil -0.6743184
106 Philippines 0.3470794 Croatia -0.7934358
107 Niger 0.3467043 Japan -0.9961692
108 Japan 0.328696 Argentina -3.343999
109 Switzerland 0.3044092 Turkey -3.380436
110 United States 0.2821151 Uruguay -9.834241
111 Malaysia 0.2622228 Denmark n/a
112 Panama 0.2567631 Belgium n/a
113 Syria 0.1653675 Italy n/a
114 Iran 0.1059841 Estonia n/a
115 Equatorial Guinea 0.0766357 Netherlands n/a
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